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mative disclosure provisions of the securities laws within the con-
text of the statutory framework It shows how private ordering can
be implemented through the definition of a "security," and con-
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tion-of-a- "security" cases, particularly including cases involving
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The mandatory disclosure requirements, anti-fraud rules and
several provisions of the federal securities statutes cover any trans-
action involving the purchase or sale of a "security,"' unless an
exemption applies. Courts have construed the broad definitions of
"security" in a vast array of contexts, ranging from worm farms2
to pension plans Given the complexity of that task and the lack
of legislative direction, the incoherence of the resulting set of rules
and exceptions is not surprising.
However, one principle remains constant throughout the cases
in this area: even if Congress and the courts are not consistent in
determining when the securities laws apply, parties to a transaction
should not be permitted to make this decision. As the Supreme
Court admonished, "in searching for the meaning and scope of the
word 'security', . . . form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality." 4 In other words,
"substance," as decided by the courts, trumps "form," as deter-
1. This article discusses the two principal securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933
(the "1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77bbbb (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1981 &
Supp. 1991). "Security" is defined in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act as follows:
[t]he term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, cer-
tificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or,
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1988). The 1934 Act defines "security"
in similar terms with minor exceptions relating to mineral leases and the exclusion of in-
struments with a maturity of nine months or less. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10). As to the latter difference, see infra notes 236-39
and accompanying text.
2. See Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding investment contract to
raise earthworms constituted a security within the meaning of both the 1933 and 1934
Acts).
3. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 553 (1979) (holding that
the Securities Acts do not apply to a noncontributory compulsory pension plan).
4. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (citing S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)).
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mined by the parties. This principle is consistent with both the
broad definition of "security," which appears to encompass virtually
all transaction "forms," and the mandatory nature of the securities
laws, exemplified by their explicit anti-waiver provisions' and
application regardless of firms' states of incorporation.
This article challenges the entrenched principle of mandatory
application both normatively and positively. From a normative
standpoint this article shows that, notwithstanding the general theo-
retical case for the federal securities laws, parties should be permit-
ted to opt out of the application of the securities laws in certain
circumstances. From a positive law standpoint this article shows
that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts interpreting the
statutes have encouraged waiving or opting out of application of
the securities laws by recognizing a role for private ordering. The
article demonstrates how a private ordering approach helps explain
the unsettled law concerning application of the federal securities
laws to general partnerships.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the "mandato-
ry disclosure" approach to the definition of a security. Under this
approach, "security" is defined in a manner consistent with policy
justifications for federal mandatory disclosure rules. After summa-
rizing these policies, Part I illustrates how they relate to the defini-
tion of a security.
Part H introduces the alternative "private ordering" approach
to the definition of "security." That section begins with theoretical
arguments for allowing parties to waive coverage of the securities
laws. It then shows how limited private ordering is consistent with
the anti-waiver provisions, as interpreted in recent Supreme Court
opinions, as well as with the approach to waiver applied by the
Supreme Court in the "sale-of-a-business" and "note" cases.
Part III demonstrates the usefulness of the private ordering
approach in explaining cases involving general partnership interests
as securities. The trend among these cases has been toward empha-
sis on the forms of transactions involved and per se exclusion of
general partnership interests from the definition of "security." These
results are consistent with the private ordering approach, but not
5. See § 14 of the 1933 Act, stating that: "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subehapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Securities
Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n. A similar provision prevents waiver of the 1934
Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
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with the mandatory disclosure approach.
I. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND THE DEFINITION OF A
"SECURITY"
The definition of a "security" is one of the most important,
yet most ambiguous, provisions in the federal securities laws. The
breadth of the definition and the constant evolution of financial
instruments in the nearly sixty years since the laws were promul-
gated preclude a narrow, mechanistic approach to interpretation. As
a result, the legislature has delegated substantial discretion to the
courts to determine which transactions should be regulated under
the federal securities laws.6 In making these determinations, courts
are justified in taking into account the policies underlying federal
mandatory disclosure. Consideration of these policy concerns is
consistent with the view that the securities laws were intended to
further the public interest.' Therefore, this article analyzes the
6. Ambiguities in any federal statute revive the ongoing debate about the proper
method of statutory interpretation - whether courts should be guided by policy consider-
ations when construing statutes or adhere strictly to the statutory language. For a discus-
sion advocating the former method of statutory construction, see HARRY M. HART &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPu-
CATION OP LAW 1415 (tent. ed. 1958) (Courts "should assume, unless the contrary un-
mistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing rea-
sonable purposes reasonably."). For a review of various approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, 262-309 (1990).
7. For another view consistent with the "public interest" approach to defining "securi-
ty," see William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Con-
textual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY LJ. 311, 315 (1984) (sug-
gesting that the market failure justification of securities regulation is implicit in the Su-
preme Court's approach for determining whether or not securities laws apply). The "public
interest" view of the federal securities laws is contrary to an explanation of the federal
securities laws as benefiting cohesive interest groups - for example, established in-
vestment banking firms seeking to impose barriers to entry in the form of onerous disclo-
sure rules against new firms. See Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclo-
sure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION (Henry G. Manne
& Ezra Solomon eds. 1974).
The interest group theory of legislation suggests that laws or regulations are the
products of a process in which various groups with diverse interests compete in the legis-
lative arena to further their respective agendas. For discussions of interest group theory,
see also ROBERT E. MCCORMCK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION
AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 7
(1981); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 139
(1975); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988). For a
leading article arguing that courts should recognize interest-group -deals" in interpreting
statutes, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term, Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1984).
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scope of coverage of the federal securities laws relative to their
underlying policy justifications. This part discusses the "mandatory
disclosure" approach to determining which transactions are appro-
priately regulated by federal disclosure laws. In contrast, the "pri-
vate ordering" approach discussed in Part H defines "security" so
as to permit private agreements to avoid coverage of the securities
laws even where the transaction may otherwise be appropriate for
mandatory disclosure.
The policy justifications discussed in this part relate both to
the affirmative disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of
19338 and to the background anti-fraud provisions in the 1933 and
1934 Acts.9 However, some justifications are more pertinent to
rules mandating specific disclosures than to anti-fraud rules which
primarily prohibit misstatements. Differences among the policies
supporting the two types of provisions are summarized in Section I
(C). That section also discusses reasons for differentiating the ap-
plication of provisions that require disclosure in connection with
investment transactions from provisions, such as insider trading
prohibitions and proxy and tender offer rules, that relate to internal
governance.
A. Justifications for Federal Mandatory Disclosure
This section discusses the "public interest" rationale for man-
datory disclosure. As shown in Section B, this rationale is useful in
understanding the factors courts have applied in defining "security."
The arguments for federal mandatory disclosure laws involve
Despite the plausibility of, and ample support for, the interest group theory as an
explanation of legislation, particularly as applied to the federal securities laws, use of this
theory in statutory interpretation may be inadvisable. First, it will often be quite difficult
for courts to determine what, if any, interest group deal underlies a statute. See, POSNER,
supra note 6, at 278 ("the presence of compromise makes the discernment of purpose
difficult and often impossible"). Furthermore, if courts were to use the alternative "public
interest" approach when interpreting ambiguous statutes, the judiciary may check inefficient
rent-seeking conduct by politicians by forcing them to make interest-group -deals they
wish to be enforced clear. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legisla-
tion Through Statutary Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,
227 (1986).
8. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26 & scheds. A, B, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa
(requiring parties to file registration statements and deliver prospectuses in connection with
distributions of securities, and prohibiting certain selling efforts and representations prior to
such filing and delivery).
9. These provisions include Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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at least four distinct steps: first, the rationale for disclosure by
firms; second, the justification for regulation despite its costs and
the existence of non-regulatory means of ensuring full disclosure;
third, the need for federal regulation even though there are well-
developed state laws of corporations and fourth, the rationale for
application of disclosure rules to a particular group of investment
instruments, or "securities," and not to other types of transactions.
These steps are considered in the following subsections.
1. Why Disclosure by Firms?
It is not immediately obvious why disclosures by firms are
important to investors. In the first place, it might seem that inves-
tors can safely ignore any such disclosures and simply rely on the
market price of securities. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
(EMH) states, in its most widely accepted, "semi-strong" form that
prices of publicly traded securities respond quickly to publicly
available information.1" Although there are credible arguments that
securities prices do not accurately reflect all publicly disclosed
information," there is little doubt that market prices provide the
10. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970), suggested a widely accepted categorization of three
"forms" of the efficient market theory: "weak," which holds that investors cannot gain by
knowing and analyzing past price histories; "semi-strong," which holds that investors can-
not gain by knowing public information; and "strong," which claims that investors cannot
gain even by knowing inside information. See also JAMES H. LORE et al., TE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EvIDENCE 57 (2d ed. 1985).
Professor Carney argues that Congress, in adopting the federal securities laws, oper-
ated under an assumption of market failure and did not have before it modem theories of
market efficiency. Carney, supra note 7, at 336-39. If Congress had no confidence in the
markets, EMH should not be used as a basis for constructing a public interest model of
the scope of the federal securities laws. However, this view would unduly restrict the
courts' role in applying securities laws. Professor Carney himself employs modem theories
of market failure in analyzing the justification for the securities laws. See id. at 343-45
(discussing market failure in terms of the modem theory of "bounded rationality"). It
seems unrealistic to use modem arguments only to support and not to qualify justifica-
tions for securities laws. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the relevance of EMH
when it adopted the "fraud-on-the-market" theory for determining reliance in lOb-5 ac-
tions. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). In all events, mandatory disclo-
sure requirements can be justified even in light of modem learning about efficient mar-
kets. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14.
11. These arguments are summarized in Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser,
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761,
761 (1985); Reinier Kraaklman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of 'Discount-
ed" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 897-98 (1988);
William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986).
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best available estimate of expected returns.12
There are two reasons why, despite EMH, investors can gain
from issuers' disclosures. First, the semi-strong form of EMH does
not mean that all information is disclosed, but only that disclosed
information is quickly reflected in price. The amount of informa-
tion available to be reflected in price depends in part on the extent
of disclosure by issuers. 3  Second, EMH does not apply, or ap-
plies only weakly, to markets (like those for general partnership
interests) in which there are relatively few trades. 14
Market inefficiency does not explain fully why disclosure by
firms is important. Investors can adjust the prices they are willing
to pay for the firm's securities to reflect a lack of information, 5
12. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 907, 915 (1989).
13. More generally, the degree of market efficiency depends on the cost to issuers of
disclosing information. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier IL Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 551 (1984).
14. In a thin market, there may not be a recent trade that reflects current information
about the firm. Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY
U. 835, 845 n.22 (1988). Also, thinly traded securities do not attract market professionals
who generate and disseminate information about stocks. See Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. MIller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Mar-
ket Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1086 (1990).
15. Lack of information can affect the market price of a security in part because it
decreases certainty of outcomes, thereby increasing the variance, or "risk," of expected re-
turns. See generally RIcHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERs, PRINCILES OF CORPO-
RATE ItNANCE, 49-56, 125-31 (3d ed. 1988). Investors can eliminate some risk associated
with specific stocks, as distinguished from the market as a whole, by holding a diversified
portfolio. See id. at 131-34. To the extent that there are gaps in information about Stock
A that produce a variance in expected returns, an investor can reduce this risk by holding
Stock B, an investment for which expected returns are negatively correlated with those of
Stock A. For example, if Stock A is that of an umbrella manufacturer, the risks the in-
vestor must bear from a rash of sunny weather will depend, for example, on the extent
of the backlog of orders for A's umbrella. But this risk for the investor can be reduced
by holding stock in firm B, a manufacturer of sunglasses.
Portfolio diversification does not, however, solve all disclosure-related problems. First,
investors need information about A's lines of business in order to diversify. Second, di-
versification is inherently imperfect because there is a component of risk - usually re-
ferred to as "market risk" - that cannot be eliminated by diversification. Id. at 156. In
the above example, the extent of A's backlog may determine the sensitivity of the busi-
ness to a general downturn in the economy, a market risk that cannot be reduced through
diversification. Third, portfolio diversification does not eliminate discounts in expected
returns resulting from investors' expectations that issuers are hiding negative information.
Nondisclosure or unreliable disclosure by issuers can also reduce expected returns be-
cause investors may assume that issuers are hiding negative information. However, it is
also possible that investors will assume that issuers are hiding positive information in
order to facilitate trading by the insiders who control disclosure.
Finally, lack of information can reduce market price by increasing asymmetry of
1992]
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or they can research whether the market has mispriced the security.
Firms' disclosures are valuable in inefficient markets where
investors and analysts may do less securities research than is so-
cially optimal. 6 Investors generally conclude their research when
the cost of the search exceeds its expected benefit." Information
that significantly changes investors' perceptions of a firm's value
nevertheless may have little effect on the value of small invest-
ments."8 In addition, information about securities traded in an ac-
tive market has a short useful life because the same information
from other sources is rapidly incorporated in stock price. Thus,
investors confronted with uncertainty about expected returns nor-
mally discount the price they are willing to pay rather than investi-
gate firms to clarify uncertainties. 9 As a result, investment dollars
may be inefficiently diverted from better- to worse-managed firms
with equivalent apparent values.2"
information among investors, leading, in turn, to increased bid-ask spreads and risk pre-
miums which market makers charge back to traders. See Douglas W. Diamond & R.
Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity and the Cost of Capital, Center for Research in Security
Prices Working Paper 289 (1990); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bi" Ask
and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14
. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
16. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681
(1984).
17. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL ECON. 213, 220
(1961) (savings expected by consumers from search for price information depend on such
factors as quantity to be purchased and dispersion of prices).
18. This effect is similar to the problem of voter non-participation which occurs in
both political and corporate governance and is explained by the theory of "rational apa-
thy." The "rational apathy- theory states that individuals who have the opportunity to
participate in an election will choose not to exercise their voting rights if they determine
that the benefits resulting from the acquisition of information concerning the election and
voting do not outweigh the costs involved in those processes. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 4-6, 260-76 (1957). For works relating the "rational
apathy" theory to corporate governance, see Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Sys-
tems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoreti-
cal Aspects of Share Voting: An Esay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1427 (1964).
19. Securities analysts are also unlikely to do an optimal amount of research. Re-
searchers cannot easily sell the information to investors with large stakes because potential
buyers of the information would be unwilling to pay much for "a pig in a poke." Dis-
closing the information before agreeing on a price could facilitate its sales, but pre-sale
disclosure also exposes the researcher to possible opportunism by the potential buyer.
20. This is an example of the "lemons" problem. See George A. Akerlof, The Market
for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488
(1970) (discussing the seller's incentive to market poor quality merchandise).
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Disclosure by finns is valuable also because it reduces
over-investment in securities research.21 Although, as just dis-
cussed, market participants lack incentives to exhaustively research
firms, they nevertheless have some incentive to discover mispriced
securities. As a result, investors and analysts will compete in a
zero-sum game to find the same information. Disclosure by issuers
can eliminate some of this duplicative research.
2. Why Regulation?
Even if disclosure by firms increases investor welfare and
helps efficiently allocate resources, these benefits do not necessarily
justify regulation. Firms have strong incentives to disclose informa-
tion about themselves even if they are not legally compelled to do
so. For example, firms can offer stock bundled with disclosure for
a price higher than that of otherwise comparable stock unaccompa-
nied by disclosure.'
Notwithstanding firms' incentives to disclose, there are some
justifications for disclosure regulation. First, not all firms produce
an optimal amount of information on their own.23 One reason is
that an individual firm cannot capture all of the benefit from its
disclosures. Some disclosures facilitate comparisons with other
firms, and therefore benefit those firms.' Also, firms may be able
to reap the benefit of other firms' development of more efficient
disclosure formats without bearing the costs.'
Second, even though finns have incentives to disclose, agents
charged with disclosure responsibilities may withhold information.
For example, a firm's agents may want to capitalize on the infor-
mation themselves" or to avoid negative adjustments in their
compensation or dismissal.
Third, investors may disbelieve even full and accurate disclo-
21. See Carney, supra note 7, at 346-47; Coffee, supra note 16, at 733 (noting the
reduction in duplicative research as a benefit); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at
681-82 (commenting that mandatory disclosure results in an optimal level of research).
22. See Douglas W. Diamond, Optimal Release of Information by Firms, 40 L FIN.
1071, 1071 (1985) (some disclosure of information reduces risks of investment and makes
investors better off by saving information costs and improving risk sharing); Diamond &
Verrecchia, supra note 15, at 23 (firms can capture gains by reducing information asym-
metry prior to sale of shares).
23. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 681-82.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 739-43 (concluding that mandatory disclosure can
result in insider trading, leveraged buyouts and management conflicts of interest).
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sure by firms. Legal liability imposed by government regulations
for fraudulent disclosures reduces costs firms otherwise would incur
to signal the veracity of their disclosures.27
The weakness in these arguments for regulation is their as-
sumption that market alternatives are inadequate. For example, the
problems associated with signalling the accuracy of firms' informa-
tion and developing disclosure forms might be resolved through
self-regulatory organizations. Stock exchanges that develop standard
disclosure forms and invest their reputational capital in signalling
the veracity of member firms' disclosure serve this self-regulatory
function. Stock exchanges can capture the benefits of this activity
through listing fees.28 The misincentives of corporate executives
regarding disclosure can be disciplined, like other agency problems,
by such devices as incentive compensation, the market for corpo-
rate control and state law fiduciary duties. 9
27. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 675-77 (reviewing the various proce-
dures firms employ to certify the truthfulness of their disclosures, then noting that rules
against fraudulent disclosure, if enforced, eliminate the need for expensive verification).
28. See Daniel P. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CM1. L. REv. 119, 122 (1987) (in addition to providing a forum
for convenient and economical transactions, stock exchanges may police the activities of
their members and use this feature as an incentive to encourage brokers to purchase a
seat on that exchange). It has been argued that state corporation and federal securities
laws have diminished the value of these a'ctivities by stock exchanges. See Jonathan
Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Sub-
stitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1038-
42 (1990). However, it does not necessarily follow that stock exchanges could not per-
form this task adequately in the absence of regulation. The adequacy of regulation by
exchanges depends partly on whether investors could accurately evaluate the quality of
exchange regulation, or instead would misallocate investment dollars to unlisted firms. It
would also depend on whether, despite these costs of market alternatives, regulation would
be inferior.
29. For a discussion of the interrelated functions of these devices in controlling agency
costs see generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:
A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990). One problem with
this argument favoring alternatives to securities regulations is that corporate executives
have greater incentives to disclose negative information inadequately than to disclose pasi-
tive information due to the effect of negative information disclosures on income and em-
ployment security. Furthermore, the executives' misincentives may be aligned with the
interests of existing holders-who may be selling-and against the interests of potential
buyers. Therefore, existing holders may not seek to discipline managers for mis-disclo-
sures. However, shareholders' benefits from inadequate disclosure are only short-term and
are likely to be swamped by negative long-term effects. A firm that causes investors to
distrust its information increases the apparent riskiness of its expected cash flows and,
thus, raises its cost of obtaining capital. These cost increases injure the firm's existing
interest holders.
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3. Why Federal Regulation?
Although state laws governing corporations are well devel-
oped,"° federal law may operate more efficiently with regard to
regulation of securities disclosures." States may over-regulate by
imposing anti-fraud liability that inefficiently benefits securities
buyers who reside in the regulating state while burdening out-of-
state firms with higher costs. 2 This may be due to the influence
30. State regulation of internal corporate affairs is subject to capital market discipline;
firms in states that do a poor job of regulating would suffer increases in their costs of
capital. See RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND TE CoRPORATIoN 9 (1978). For evi-
dence supporting this assertion see Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Cor-
porate Charters: Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259
(1980) (reporting results of a study showing that the value of stock generally rises in the
months immediately preceding and following a change in the state of incorporation).
31. Note, however, that federal regulation of disclosure is also imperfect. For example,
disclosure standards may be deliberately set at a high level at the behest of established
disclosers in order to deter entry of newcomers. See Mane, supra note 7, at 35.
Empirical evidence of the effects of the federal securities laws is mixed. Two studies
show that investors in new issues, as compared with investors in the rest of the market,
fared insignificantly worse prior to the 1933 Act than those who invested in new issues
after the Act. Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market
for New Security Issues, 24 J. L. & ECON. 613, 638 (1981); George J. Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 . Bus. 117, 121 (1964). Comparisons between
new and existing issues are no longer helpful because the entire market was regulated
after 1934. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 711. Another study found that
risk-adjusted stock performance was not aided by the 1934 Act requirement that sales
figures be disclosed. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An
Evaluation of the Benston Securities Exchange Act of 1934, AM. ECON. REV., March
1973, at 132. But other required disclosures may have helped investors, or sales data may
have been reflected in stock price even without affirmative disclosure. Thus, the results
are consistent with the theory that the securities laws reduce the costs of uncovering
information. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 635-42 (1984).
Finally, the most recent major study finds that investors in speculative new issues
did better after 1933 than before, and that there was greater dispersion of abnormal re-
turns prior to 1933. Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor
Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 306 (1989).
The results of the study support the theory that the information prevalent during the pre-
regulatory period was of a lower quality than information available since the 1933 Act.
Id. at 308-10. However, the results also support the theory that marginal companies, with
more volatile returns, were forced out of the market in the regulatory period. Id. at 315.
32. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 697-98. Courts have permitted actions
against wholly out-of-state firms that solicited sales to residents of the regulating state.
See Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927) (states can regulate solicita-
tions by out-of-state firms that have not complied with their laws); Green v. Weis, Voisin,
Cannon, Inc., 479 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1973) (state securities statute held applicable to out-
of-state finn soliciting sales in the state). See also Paulos v. Best Sec., Inc., 109 N.W.2d
576 (Minn. 1961) (permitting service of process against out-of-state firm that solicited
sales of securities in the state).
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of interest groups in the state, such as lawyers seeking litigation
business.
33
Conversely, states may under-regulate affirmative disclosure by
firms. If firms' disclosure policies are not fully disciplined by the
market,' it follows that states lack incentives to adopt corporation
statutes with provisions that embody these policies. Moreover,
states may fail to adopt statutes protecting their own residents from
disclosure failures by out-of-state corporations if interest groups in
the state have not promoted this type of regulation. The influence
of interest groups may also explain why, although all states have
securities statutes protecting residents from misrepresentations and
non-disclosures, most have very small enforcement budgets.
4. Why Federal Regulation of "Securities?"
Many of the above arguments potentially apply to all kinds of
transactions, including the sale or lease of consumer goods and
services. Consumers may have little incentive to search for infor-
mation, and those consumers who do search for information may
duplicate the search efforts of others. Firms in all markets have
trouble signalling the veracity of their information, and their agents
have incentives to mislead the markets concerning the firms' prod-
ucts and its financial results. A critical aspect of the policy ap-
Note that the existence of federal regulation does not imply the non-existence of
state regulations with the potential to shift costs out of state. Whether exploitative state
regulation is unconstitutional depends on the commerce clause rather than on the existence
of a federal statute. For an analysis of the state exploitation issue under the "negative"
commerce clause see Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes,
the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause and Insider Trading, 1987 SUP. Cr. REV. 47
(1988).
Enactment of a federal law may, but does not necessarily, lead to invalidation of
inconsistent state regulation under the supremacy clause. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding a state anti-takeover statute against an
argument that the statute was inconsistent with federal takeover legislation and therefore
unconstitutional under the supremacy clause). For a particularly narrow view of the reach
of the supremacy clause in the takeover context see Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Uni-
versal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 367 (1989). In
fact, the federal disclosure statutes preclude a supremacy clause challenge to state disclo-
sure laws by providing that they do not supplant state securities laws. Securities Act of
1933, §18, 15 U.S.C. §77r, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §28, 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a).
33. See Jonathan L Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469, 502-05 (1987) (discussing the rele-
vance of lawyers to corporate law and applying the interest group theory to Delaware
law).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
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proach to defining "security" is determining why federal regulation
should be applied to investment interests but not to other proper-
ty.3 The reasons for this distinction are discussed in the follow-
ing subsections.
a. Nature of Facts to be Disclosed
Disclosure regulation is arguably more necessary for invest-
ment securities than for other products because of the nature of the
information required by investors. All products are evaluated on the
basis of their expected future performance. The utility of a tangible
product is determined in part by an assessment of its physical
characteristics and in part by the past performance of products with
similar characteristics. For example, the use value of an automobile
depends partly on a determination of whether it is equipped with
air bags, and partly on how air bags have performed in tests and
in use on other cars.
Full disclosure in connection with a consumer product would
involve both the identity of the product's characteristics and perfor-
mance data related to these qualities. Because producers can make
identification disclosures most cheaply, it is not surprising to ob-
serve producers disclosing such things as the ingredients of food
and drugs and the mileage of used cars. But regulation of disclo-
sure of product characteristics is less common because the relevant
facts are obvious to consumers and easy to evaluate.3 6 Disclosure
by producers of performance data, such as the effects of vitamins
and the amount of cholesterol in food, is less costly than acquisi-
tion of that information by individual consumers, and performance
data are more difficult for consumers to evaluate than product
35. Federal laws regulate disclosure in connection with some non-"security" products.
See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1988) (requiring warnings for
consumer products); Magneson-Moss Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1988) (governing disclosure
requirements for disclaimer of warranties). However, these disclosure requirements are not
nearly as extensive as those required for 'securities." Also, there is no federal anti-fraud
law for non-"security" products. Note that while many of the policies discussed in this
section may justify a distinction between products and "securities" with regard to affirma-
tive disclosure rules, the policies may not justify a distinction with respect to the need for
anti-fraud rules. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
36. See Daniel R. Fischel, Regulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of New Futures
Contracts, 59 . BUS. S85, S92-93 (1986) (employing the consumer goods analogy to
argue that the "observability" of features of new futures contracts reduces the need for
regulation of the futures market). Nevertheless, regulation of product disclosures is becom-
ing more common. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 343-1 (West Supp. 1991).
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characteristics. However, third parties can compile and credibly
signal the accuracy of facts about categories of products, reducing
information costs for both producers and consumers. Thus, produc-
ers usually do not disclose such facts, and producer disclosures of
this information generally are neither mandated nor regulated.
The value of products purchased for resale depends on the
future performance of markets in which the product is traded. For
example, while a defective house is always worth less than the
equivalent nondefective house, the values of both defective and
nondefective houses are influenced by the national economy, inter-
est rates and conditions in the local real estate market. Because the
producers usually know no more about future market performance
than the purchasers, producers rarely disclose facts about the mar-
ket. These observations also apply to commodity futures con-
tracts.37
Investment securities are distinguishable from other property
because the resale value of the securities depends not only on
market conditions generally, but also on the performance of manag-
ers and other parties to the firm's contracts. Thus, evaluation of
securities requires disclosure of many facts relating to managers'
skills, including their identities, past affiliations and past financial
results. Because investors and third parties cannot easily discover
these facts, total disclosure costs are significantly less if these facts
are disclosed by promoters rather than discovered separately by
each investor.
b. Formatting
There are also differences between investment securities and
other products regarding the formatting of disclosures. In particular,
earnings history is useful for evaluating securities, but only quali-
fiedly so. Past returns may have been generated by personnel or
reflect circumstances that differ from current conditions, and de-
pend to some extent on general market conditions regardless of
management skill. But investors' judgment is often clouded by
biases that may cause them to overlook these qualifications. Per-
haps the most relevant bias affecting securities investors is "anchor-
ing bias," in which investors give the starting point of evaluation,
37. See Dennis W. Carlton, Futures Markets: Their Purpose, Their History, Their
Growth, Their Successes and Failures, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 237, 241 (1984) (discuss-
ing factors that determine prices of commodity future contracts).
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i.e., past performance, undue weight without adjusting adequately
for future contingencies.38 To offset these biases securities disclo-
sures ought to include prominent qualifications and disclaimers. In
contrast, past performance results for mass-produced items are help-
ful in predicting future performance, and statements about the
future performance of commodities are easily recognized as de-
pending on the inherently unpredictable future performance of the
markets in which they are traded.
Another formatting problem applicable to investment securities
is investors' need for standardization. Because disclosures concern-
ing management are largely subjective, and consequently more
complex, it is easy for risk factors to escape readers' attention.
"Bottom line" financial results can be misleading because of non-
comparable methods of calculation. Standardized formats organize
complex information and facilitate comparison of different finns'
financial results.
c. Efficiency of Central Disclosure to Multiple Investors
Regulation of securities disclosures insures that information
will be produced centrally by firms rather than individually by
investors. This overcomes investors' inadequate incentives to inves-
tigate39 and reduces duplicative research.'
Although the same justifications for regulation might seem
applicable to any mass-produced product, investment securities
differ from other products with respect to these considerations.
First, because information needed for complete evaluation of a
security is much more expensive for investors to produce than
information regarding the .utility of a product, both under-
production of information and duplication of research are more
likely to result with regard to investment securities.
Second, central disclosure of securities information is efficient
because the exact information is relevant to all securities investors.
38. For a review of the literature and application to securities investment, see Carney,
supra note 7, at 344, nn.132-35. Professor Carney reviews factors that justify a special
disclosure regime for securities. Id. at 339-49. This review is useful, but it fails to dis-
tinguish adequately securities from other commodities. For example, a single advertisement
for an automobile may involve forward-looking statements that are difficult to verify,
incentives to pass off shoddy products, judgment biases of purchasers and potentially high
costs of fraud, to name some of the factors Carney emphasizes with respect to "securi-
ties."
39. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
40. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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By contrast, because a product's utility varies to some extent
among purchasers depending on intended use of the product, differ-
ent information may be relevant to different purchasers.
d. Facilitating Litigation of Common Questions
Federal mandatory disclosure permits resolution of common
factual and legal questions arising out of a national stock offering
in a single proceeding.41  In contrast, litigation involving a
nationally-marketed, defective product is likely to involve disparate
questions concerning how and when the product was used by in-
jured consumers. Thus, federal securities laws provide investors an
additional benefit that a federal regulatory scheme could not pro-
vide to purchasers of other products.
5. Summary
The foregoing discussion supports the following conclusions
concerning transactions for which federal disclosure regulation is
efficient:
(1) The federal securities laws should be applied only to
transactions that present the special problems of costly discovery,
verification and formatting commonly associated with investment
securities.
(2) The efficiency of central disclosure by firms increases as
investments become more standardized, are sold in smaller blocks
or are more widely distributed.
(3) Federal regulation is particularly appropriate for national
offerings, as compared with intra-state sales of closely held compa-
nies.
B. Application to the Definition of a Security
This section shows that the justifications advanced for manda-
tory disclosure are consistent with, and help inform, some of the
judicial tests for the existence of an "investment contract."42
41. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 679.
42. Whether a general partnership interest is covered by the securities laws depends on
whether it is an "investment contract" under Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act or Section
3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(a)(10). A general partnership
interest also could be characterized as a "participation in any profit-sharing agreement,"
which is another instrument included in the statutory definition of "security." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(a)(10). However, this category has
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1. Overview of Tests
In its first interpretation of the term "investment contract," the
Supreme Court defined the term in light of what it deemed to be
the legislative policy underlying the federal securities laws rather
than according to some conventional meaning of the term.43 Three
years later, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Court spelled out the
elements of an investment contract:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the
enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nomi-
nal interests in the physical assets employed in the enter-
prise.
44
William Carney has argued that courts construing the term
"investment contract" are applying factors in addition to those
listed in Howey. The extra factors relate the need for federal regu-
lation to the characteristics of the markets in which the transaction
occurred.4' This "public interest" approach applies the securities
laws to the extent appropriate to redress market failure.46 Thus,
according to Carney, in contexts where the peculiar problems that
supposedly infect the securities markets47 are found to be lacking,
the courts do not apply the securities laws. Examples Carney offers
to support this conclusion include the Supreme Court's refusal to
not been applied in the partnership cases, and in general has been used infrequently. HAR-
OLD S. BLOOMENTHA, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 4.02 (1990-91 ed.).
43. SEC v. CM. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). In Joiner, the Court held
that assignments of oil and gas leases combined with promises to drill were securities. Id.
at 345.
44. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
45. Carney, supra note 7, at 317-30.
46. Id. at 332-33. For a discussion of the public interest approach generally, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text. Carney compares this approach to justifying application of
the securities laws with the more formalistic definition of a "security" devised in Howey.
Discussion of the Howey factors later in this section shows that the courts have applied
these factors in a manner consistent with the "public interest" approach.
47. Carney cites the complex, forward-looking nature of information relevant to secu-
rities, judgment biases and rational apathy of investors, incentives for promoters and deal-
ers to lie about securities transactions, and high potential costs of securities fraud as rea-
sons for market failure in the securities markets. Carney, supra note 7, at 339-49.
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apply the securities laws where investors were protected by federal
pension law4" or deposit insurance,4 9 in smaller offerings where
investors would be likely to expend substantial resources to investi-
gate,s5 or where a material aspect of the investment package was
real estate or some other commodity that did not involve the pecu-
liar information problems of other investments.5' The following
subsections elaborate on some elements of tests for the existence of
a security that are particularly relevant to general partnerships.
2. Expectation of Profits from Efforts of Others
The fourth element of the Howey test requires an expectation
of profits from the efforts of others.52 It has been the factor
stressed most in general partnership cases.53 This test has evolved
from its initial expression in Howey in that the courts now com-
monly find a "security" to exist even where the investor contrib-
utes some efforts. The leading case is SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc. in which the court held in favor of a security
even though investors recruited prospects because the promoter was
responsible for the actual selling.' The court concluded that
Howey required only a showing that "the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise."5
5
The Howey test can be rationalized on the ground that it is the
investment in another's management skills that presents the peculiar
48. Carney, supra note 7, at 360 (discussing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979)).
49. Id. at 361 (discussing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982), which
holds that a bank certificate of deposit protected by federal banking law is not a securi-
ty).
50. Id. at 355-56 (discussing United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858
(1975), which holds that an investment in common stock of a cooperative housing cor-
poration did not constitute a security because the investment was not in the pursuit of
profit, but was for personal consumption).
51. Id. at 361-63 (discussing SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946), which
holds that the securities laws do not apply to contracts that take the form of "land sales
contracts").
52. See supra text accompanying note 44.
53. See Section Mn(A), infra notes 129-49.
54. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
55. Id. at 482. The Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted this construction of the
Howey test. However, in United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852, n.16
(1975), the Court omitted the word "solely" from its recitation of the Howey "expectation
of profits" test.
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problems arguably justifying regulation of securities, as distin-
guished from other commodities.' The fact that expected returns
depend on the skills of others means, among other things, that in-
vestigation by investors is costly, that the issuer is in a particularly
good position to produce relevant disclosures, and that formatting
of those disclosures is important.'
3. Existence of a Common Enterprise: Incentive for Search and
Overproduction of Information
The "common enterprise" element has been interpreted as in-
volving two factors: "vertical commonality," a common enterprise
between the investor and the promoter," and "horizontal common-
ality," the pooling of fortunes of a number of investors. 9 With
respect to vertical commonality, it is not clear why it matters
whether the promoter's gains are proportionate to those of the
other investors. Indeed, a vertical commonality requirement seems
to cut in exactly the wrong direction: correlating the promoter's
and investors' gains aligns their interests, which would arguably
decrease the investors' risk and, therefore, reduce the need for dis-
closure. On the other hand, horizontal- commonality arguably makes
sense because if several investors share returns of the same issuer
pro rata, requiring central disclosure by the issuer eliminates
duplicative research.'
56. For a discussion of special disclosure problems associated with investment securities
see supra text accompanying notes 35-41. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shnnking Defini-
tion of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security
Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 243-44 (1982) (arguing that securities are "intricate
merchandise" justifying special disclosure regulation).
57. See supra text accompanying note 38.
58. For a holding that a common enterprise requires only "vertical commonality," but
that this requirement is not satisfied with respect to a discretionary trading account be-
cause a broker's compensation is not based on the customers' profits, see Brodt v. Bache
& Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a discretionary commodities account is
not an investment contract and therefore, not a security). See also Meredith v.
Conticommodity Sew., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,701 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that a
discretionary commodities trading account was not a security after finding neither hon-
zontal nor vertical commonality).
59. For cases in which the absence of horizontal commonality contributed to the
courts' findings that no security existed, see Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867
F.2d 278, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1989) (yacht charter service); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.) (discretionary trading account), cert. dented, 409
U.S. 887 (1972); Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Spectrum Leasing Corp., 719 F.
Supp. 346, 352 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (leasing agreement).
60. See supra text accompanying note 21. For an argument relating mandatory disclo-
sure as a means to reduce research costs to the test for the existence of a "security," but
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Horizontal commonality in the sense of a large number of
investors could also signal transactions susceptible to underproduc-
tion of necessary information; the larger an offering, the smaller
each investor's financial share61 and, therefore, the smaller each
holder's incentive to search for information. Under this rationale
for requiring horizontal commonality, the size of the offering serves
only as a proxy for the size of each buyer's investment.62 Thus,
even an offering to a small number of investors might involve
investments of sufficiently small size to raise the incentive-for-
search problem and, conversely, a huge offering may involve suffi-
ciently large investments to justify substantial search costs.
Viewed in light of the underlying policy justifications, the
thrust of the horizontal commonality element appears to be a re-
quirement of multiple investors rather than "commonality," or the
nature of sharing among these investors.63 Marine Bank v. Weav-
er supports use of a multiple-investor test. In that case, the
Court held that a two-party profit sharing agreement, involving the
lease of a pasture was not a security.' The uniqueness of the ar-
rangement meant that there would be only one information search
rather than multiple searches. In addition, the sole investor had
substantial incentives to search for information.
4. Application of Securities Laws to Closely Held Firms
The factors discussed above suggest that the federal securities
laws often are inapplicable to closely held firms. Investors in close-
ly held firms usually depend on their own managerial and monitor-
ing skills, and therefore have relatively little need for information
bearing on returns that may be expected from the "efforts of oth-
not explicitly to horizontal commonality, see Carney, supra note 7, at 355-57.
61. This assumes limited liability. For a discussion of the effect on this analysis of
holding investors personally liable, see infra text accompanying notes 151-55.
62. See Carney, supra note 7, at 373.
63. For other commentary advocating a multiple-investor theory, see James D. Gordon
I1, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining Invest-
ment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 635, 636.
64. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
65. Id. at 560. See also Mace Neufeld Prod., Inc. v. Orion Pictures Corp., 860 F.2d
944, 947 (9th Cir. 1988) (contract for the production of the "Cagney and Lacey" televi-
sion series was a joint venture negotiated one-on-one and therefore deemed not a security
under Marine Bank). Note, however, that the Marine Bank Court did not explicitly rely
on the Howey test, and the Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed the horizontal
commonality requirement. See Mordaunt v. Incommco, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985) (Justice
White dissenting on denial of certiorari).
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ers." Also, because the arrangement often involves a unique one-
on-one contract like the agreement involved in Marine Bank,'
central disclosure by the firm is rarely necessary to overcome prob-
lems of under- and over-production of securities research.
Excepting closely held firms from classification as "securities"
is also justified by the fact that most close corporation financing
involves entirely intra-state transactions. In this situation, there is
no reason to believe that the transaction will be inadequately or
excessively regulated by state law,' and no need for a federal
mechanism to try issues arising out of a multi-state offering in a
single proceeding."
Some potential arguments against a closely held firm exception
do not withstand careful examination. One faulty contention is that
because interests in such firms are not priced in an efficient mar-
ket, investors need disclosures as a substitute for accurate market
pricing. However, as previously discussed,69 the need for manda-
tory disclosure is not necessarily correlated with efficient market
pricing. A second argument against exempting close corporations
from securities regulations is that, because investors in most of
those firms cannot readily exit the firm by selling their shares, they
are more at risk from potential mismanagement than investors in
publicly traded firms. However, closely held firms trade "voice," in
the form of direct input into management," for "exit" as protec-
tion against potential mismanagement.7
Despite justifications for not applying the securities laws to
closely-held firms, courts have not yet recognized this exception as
an across-the-board rule. For example, while the Court in Marine
Bank found no "security" in a one-on-one transaction, the Court
later held in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth that the securities
laws applied to the sale of an entire closely held business.72 Note,
66. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
68. See supra text accompanying note 41.
69. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
70. For a discussion of such protective devices in general partnerships see infra text
accompanying notes 137-48. Analogous devices are available in close corporations. See
generally LARRY E. PIBSTmN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 132-86 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing
shareholder voting arrangements and agreements controlling actions by the board of direc-
tors).
71. See generally ALBERT D. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 62-75 (1970)
(seminal discussion of the choice between vocalizing dissent - "voice" - or leaving the
firm - "exit-).
72. 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 226-
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however, that Landreth involved "stock," a per se "security." 73
For transactions, like that in Marine Bank, that are not clearly
within the statutory definition of "security," the Court may hold in
favor of a broad exclusion for closely held firms.74
Application of the securities laws to closely held firms is,
therefore, confused both doctrinally and theoretically. The private
ordering approach suggested by this article provides a way out of
this confusion: investors should be able to choose coverage or non-
coverage of the securities laws by selecting between the close
corporation and partnership forms. As discussed below,75 courts
essentially do offer investors this choice.
C. Affirmative Disclosure v. Anti-fraud Protection
Thus far, the discussion in this part has concerned federal
disclosure regulation generally. Some of the justifications advanced
for federal securities regulation support only affirmative disclosure
requirements, not federal prohibitions against fraud.76 This is im-
portant where, as with the general partnership interests that are the
focus of this article, the transaction is exempt from the 1933 Act's
36 and accompanying text. Another prominent case in which the Supreme Court applied
the securities laws to a closely held firm is Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971) (applying § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to determine if the sale of stock constituted fraud or deceit).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 21948.
74. See Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring)
(acknowledging strong reasons for not applying the securities laws to closely held firms,
but noting that Rule lOb-5 probably does not allow such a limitation because it applies to
the "purchase or sale of any security").
75. See infra text accompanying notes 163-263.
76. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g(a) and Sedurities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b). The anti-fraud provisions require affirmative
disclosures only to the extent necessary to make an affirmative statement not misleading.
There is no liability for other nondisclosures absent an independent duty to disclose. See
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("[sflence, absent a duty to dis-
close, is not misleading under lOb-5"); Roeder v. Alpha Industr., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26
(1st Cir. 1987) (no affirmative duty to disclose corporate bribe even if it was material).
However, such a duty may result from another federal law, as in the case of insider
trading. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) ("an affirmative duty to
disclose material information . . . has been traditionally imposed on corporate *insiders,'
particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders."). State law may also impose a
duty to disclose. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1987)
(discussing corporation's duty to disclose to an employee stockholder who was contem-
plating leaving the corporation and forfeiting stock). When a duty to disclose arises from
state law, federal law essentially describes the remedy for a breach and the requisite
scope of disclosure.
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registration requirements as a private, limited or intrastate offering
even if the transaction involves a "security."
To justify federal anti-fraud protection for "securities," it is
necessary to consider why such protection should not be available
for non-"securities." Most of the distinctions between "securities"
and non-"securities," 77 including efficiency of federal formatting
rules and mandatory central disclosure, relate to affirmative dis-
closure obligations rather than to remedies for fraudulent misstate-
ments. Only the role of federal regulation in facilitating national
litigation of common questions applies to both fraud and affirma-
tive disclosure.78 This suggests that "security" should be defined
for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions to apply only to broadly-
marketed instruments which may give rise to national common-
questions litigation.79 Unfortunately, however, the securities laws
include a single definition of "security" that arguably does not ac-
commodate the theoretical distinctions between affirmative disclo-
sure in public offerings and anti-fraud regulation.8 °
77. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
78. See supra text accompanying note 41. Other justifications for regulation do not
support a distinction between "securities" and other property. For example, the relative
efficiency of federal as compared with state regulation applies to any nationally-marketed
commodity. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
79. Ironically, in this context the anti-fraud affirmative-disclosure distinction is least im-
portant because the transaction probably is covered by both types of provisions.
80. A "bi-level" definition would be most significant for the 1933 Act, which includes
both affirmative disclosure and anti-fraud provisions. The definitions of "security" in both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts are qualified with the language "unless the context otherwise
requires." Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c. "Context" logically refers to the defined terms as used in the
statute rather than the transactional context. See Marc L Steinberg & William E.
Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of 'Security': The 'Context' Clause,
'Investment Contract' Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 505
(1987).
The application of the federal securities laws to matters other than disclosure in con-
nection with investors' purchase or sale of securities, particularly proxy solicitation, tender
offers and insider trading, raises different questions. It is hard to see why these matters
should be singled out from other aspects of internal corporate governance and regulated at
the federal level. Indeed, the justification for federal regulation of these matters is even
weaker than the justification for affirmative disclosure regulation. While state statutes pro-
tecting residents from disclosure failures by out-of-state firms often suffer from inadequate
or excessive regulation, state statutes applied only to locally incorporated firms are not
plagued by these problems. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34. Furthermore, proxy
and tender offer regulations most often apply to publicly traded corporations in which
interests are exchanged in efficient markets that effectively discipline contract terms. Ac-
cordingly, federal regulation of those matters is less compelling than regulation of close
corporations making initial public offerings, the situation where market discipline is weak-
est. However, concerns arising from regulation in these other matters are distinct from
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II. THE PRIVATE ORDERING APPROACH
The private ordering approach discussed in this part diverges
from the mandatory disclosure approach whenever the parties'
contracts or expectations are enforced without regard to whether
the transaction is one for which the justifications for mandatory
disclosure generally apply. For example, a transaction deliberately
structured as a private offering may avoid registration because the
costs of disclosure would be deemed to outweigh the benefits,
given the nature of the transaction. In this analysis, the policies
governing mandatory disclosure determine the scope of securities
law coverage. In contrast, under the private ordering approach,
parties can effectively agree to avoid the securities laws even in
transactions to which federal law otherwise would apply.
The central premise of the private ordering approach is that
voluntary transactions in developed markets are presumed to be
efficient. Accordingly, even if a federally-mandated disclosure
system generally is cost-justified, it should be considered only a
standard form which parties can draft around absent evidence of a
problem requiring regulation. The policy, justifications for the pri-
vate ordering approach relate to the propriety of enforcing contracts
rather than to the propriety of mandating disclosure.
Section A discusses policy justifications for permitting limited
waiver of the securities laws. Section B shows how construing
"security" to permit private ordering is consistent with the existing
statutory and regulatory scheme, including the statutory definition
of a "security," exemptions from registration and anti-waiver provi-
sions of the securities laws.
A. A Policy Justification for Limited Waiver of
the Securities Laws
The basic objection to waiver of the securities laws is that
investors may improvidently forgo coverage in situations where
mandatory disclosure is appropriate. The following discussion ex-
amines some specific problems with private contracting and meth-
ods of dealing with these problems short of prohibiting all waivers
of mandatory disclosure requirements.
those discussed in this article, since they suggest there should be no federal remedy at all
in these circumstances, rather than help to identify a -security."
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1. Investor Information Problems
One problem with waiver is that investors may agree to trans-
actions unaware that the terms include a waiver provision. Investors
who purchase in an initial offering and subsequently receive con-
tracting materials may not have even read their supposed contract.
Similarly, investors who purchase in the secondary market may be
bound by accepting terms in a firm's articles of incorporation or
partnership agreement without even receiving a contract or other
disclosure document. As a result, investors may not fully discount
the price of the security to reflect waiver of the disclosure require-
ments, and promoters may opt out of the securities laws even
where the benefits of coverage exceed the cost. Moreover, these
problems may adversely impact even regulated securities because
investors may be confused as to when the securities laws apply.
Thus, opting out may be privately optimal for some firms but not
socially optimal given costs imposed on firms that do not waive
disclosure requirements.
More serious problems concern investors who know at the time
of the transaction of the existence of a waiver, but who do not
fully understand its effect. Because they are subject to judgment
biases,8" investors might erroneously believe that relatively limited
disclosures firms may choose to make are adequate without recog-
nizing the need for qualifying and hedging disclosures that would
be required by the federal securities laws. Furthermore, permitting
waiver may lead to a proliferation of disclosure regimes that inves-
tors could not easily evaluate.
Those who object to private ordering might argue that these
problems can be resolved only by mandating detailed disclosure.
Advocates of private ordering would respond that efficient markets
protect ignorant investors. Investor ignorance should not pose a
problem where securities are traded in an active market because
informed investors would discount waiver costs into securities
prices.' It has been shown in the consumer products context that
81. See supra text accompanying note 38.
82. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 29, at 42; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel K.
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1435 (1989).
Permitting waiver may increase investor uncertainty about the completeness of a
finm's disclosure, thereby increasing information costs and decreasing market efficiency
with regard to that firm. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13 (discussing the
elements which lead to and limit market efficiency). The important point is that investor
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the market will reach a competitive equilibrium as to both price
and contract terms as long as there are a substantial number of
comparison shoppers in the market, even if many of the buyers do
not shop.83 With respect to financial products, analysts and the
financial press occupy a role similar to that of comparison shop-
pers in the consumer product market. s' In addition, the market
prices of publicly traded securities are "informed" by the informa-
tion and judgments of thousands of ordinary investors.8 5
It follows from this analysis that opting out of the securities
laws by firms traded in an efficient market is not a concern as
long as it is not costly for investors to determine which firms have
opted out. If it is costly for investors to make this determination,
there is a potential externality problem, since even firms that do
not waive securities law coverage may be adversely affected by the
concerns about decreased market efficiency will be reflected in the share prices of firms
that opt out of the mandatory disclosure regime. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (1989).
83. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1404
(1983); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638
(1979).
84. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 29, at 47.
85. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 579-88 (1984). Empirical evidence re-
garding the effect of corporate contract terms on stock prices is consistent with this theo-
retical picture. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of
Care Standard in Corporate Governance: An Analysis of the Trans Union Decision and
Subsequent Delaware Legislation, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 69 (1990) (finding a "significant
decrease in the relative value of Delaware fims both around the enactment of [a Dela-
ware statute allowing corporations to amend their articles of incorporation to limit
directors' liability for breach of the duty of care] and when they elect to adopt the provi-
sions of the statute"). Studies concerning the effect of judicial decisions on stock prices
have been more equivocal. See id. at 6 (finding that the Delaware court's opinion in
Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), did "not appear to have had a signifi-
cant effect on the stock price of Delaware corporations vis-a-vis corporations incorporated
in other states")); Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indetermina-
cy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
551, 553 (1987) (finding "no statistically significant market reaction" to seven Delaware
court decisions, not including Van. Gorkum, "all of which appeared to make significant,
unanticipated changes in Delaware corporate law"). But there are inherent problems in
measuring the effect of judicial decisions, particularly the difficulty of determining how
judicial decisions will be interpreted and applied. See generally, Ronald 3. Gilson, The
Law and Finance of the Business Judgment Rule: Comments on Bradley & Schipani and
Shapiro (Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, working
Paper Series No. 55, August, 1989) (noting that Van Gorkum could be interpreted both as
a management-entrenchment case and as a pro-fiduciary duty case). These problems do
not necessarily apply to a clear statutory or contract provision.
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decisions of other firms to opt out.86
Waiver is more difficult to defend with respect to "unseasoned"
companies or investments that are not actively traded. Because
these firms are not followed by many analysts and because their
security prices do not represent a consensus of many investors,
their stock prices may not fully discount the effects of disclosure
waivers as would the stock prices of more actively traded firms.
Individual investors are protected in some offerings by the partici-
pation of institutional investors who are able to bargain knowledge-
ably over price and by promoters' and underwriters' incentives to
protect their reputations for fair dealing. But these constraints may
not fully compensate for the loss of efficient market protection. 7
The problems are particularly acute in relatively small offerings
that do not involve the participation of a widely-known underwrit-
er, institutional investors or a promoter who intends to engage m
repeat dealings."8
2. Reconciling Waiver with the Market Failure Assumption
Arguments for private ordering seem to founder on the basic
objection that such waiver is inconsistent with the market failure
assumptions underlying mandatory disclosure. But, even assuming
that investors have a particular need for information with respect to
the purchase of a "security" and that legally-regulated affirmative
disclosure is generally cost-justified, 9 it does not necessarily fol-
low that investors will be victimized by waivers of disclosure obli-
gations. Even if opt-out were permitted, most firms probably would
find it advantageous to adhere voluntarily to the standardized dis-
86. It has been argued that waiver should not be permitted even in the presence of
efficient market pricing because it inhibits judicial testing, and therefore decreases the
value, of standardized terms. See Gordon, supra note 82, at 1567-69. A corollary to this
argument is that proliferation of customized disclosure regimes reduces the value of stan-
dard formatting provided by a single regime. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
However, this problem arises only where many firms choose to opt out of the standard
regime. In other words, assuming efficient market discipline of decisions to opt out, the
Gordon argument would mandate coverage precisely where the market confirms it is most
necessary to permit opt out. Butler & Ribstem, supra note 29, at 50.
87. For commentary concluding that pricing of fiduciary duty opt-outs is apt to be
inaccurate in initial public offerings, see William . Carney, The Limits of the Fraud on
the Market Doctrne, 44 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1284 (1989) and Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1517-24 (1989).
88. See Gordon, supra note 82, at 1558-62 (1989) (pncmg of fiduciary duty opt-outs
is likely to be accurate in initial public offerings, but not in small offerings).
89. See Section I(A), supra notes 1041.
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closure regime in order to avoid increases in their cost of capital
which could result from using disclosure regimes unfamiliar to
investors. In such a world, opting out of disclosure regulation
would send an unmistakable signal about quality that is much
easier for investors to evaluate than the quality of disclosure in a
wholly unregulated market." Indeed, investors may be more likely
to over-discount than to under-discount the securities of issuers
who opt out of the federal disclosure regime.
Even if private markets will not completely discipline waivers
of disclosure requirements, it is necessary to balance the costs of
market deficiency against the benefit of forgoing compliance with
the mandatory disclosure system in situations where mandatory
disclosure may be inappropriate. First, the costs to investors are
limited by the existence of "backup" protection in the form of
common law fraud actions and the blue sky laws. Furthermore,
concern with inefficient waiver is most acute in the context of
small initial offerings where, in fact, waiver may be the most cost-
justified. The cost of full-fledged compliance with 1933 Act regis-
tration requirements will likely be a large percentage of the total
amount raised in the offer. By comparison, larger firms incur not
only less cost per dollar raised, but possibly even less total cost
because they can substitute filings they have already prepared un-
der the 1934 Act for 1933 Act disclosures.9 Thus, for larger,
more seasoned issuers, compliance with the 1933 Act is apt to be
a relatively low-cost quality assurance with which few would dis-
pense. While exemptions are available for relatively small offer-
ings,' it may be costly for the firms involved to make the inves-
tigations necessary to determine whether the exemptions exist and
the disclosures to qualify for them.93
90. Cf. Macey & Kanda, supra note 28, at 1041 (public offering of securities sends
"highly credible signal" that firm's securities are valuable because of liability under the
securities laws).
91. See Forms S-2 and S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.12-.13 (1991).
92. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 3(a)(1)-(11), 3(b), 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(1)-(11),
77c(b), 77d. The most important set of exemptions for small offerings is Regulation D,
Rules 501-506. See 17 CFR § 230.501-.506 (1991).
93. For example, to take advantage of some of the exemptions under Regulation D,
firms must disclose information and determine the wealth of investors. See Rules 501,
502, 505 and 506, 17 CFR § 230.501-.502, .505-.506 (covering offerings of over
$500,000).
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3. Middle-Ground Alternatives
Even if the costs of unregulated waiver are likely to exceed the
benefits of such a policy, there are alternatives to a blanket prohi-
bition on waiver that may represent an efficient middle ground.
a. Highlighting Waiver
Permission for waiver might be conditioned on sending inves-
tors in both the primary and secondary markets documents that
include clearly highlighted waiver terms. Methods devised in other
contexts for highlighting important terms can be applied to disclo-
sure of waivers.' Because of the difficulties of ensuring that
waivers are brought to the attention of secondary purchasers, issu-
ers that opt out of the securities laws may have to restrict trans-
fers.
b. Limiting Eligible Purchasers
Concerns about investor ignorance of the effect of waiver could
be addressed by enforcing waiver only as to investors most likely
to understand its consequences. Existing rules permitting opt-out for
"accredited investors"95 have the same effect.
c. Broker/Dealer Regulation
Concerns about waiver could also be addressed by shifting
responsibilities from issuers to the brokers and dealers who actually
sell the securities and by imposing special rules governing the sale
of unregulated securities. This philosophy underlies recent reforms
relating to "penny stocks." Because of abuses associated with low-
priced securities, including lack of price information and risky
"blank check" offerings by issuers who will begin operating in the
future, the SEC has adopted Rule 15c2-6,96 which prohibits bro-
kers from selling certain of these low-priced securities to customers
for whom the investment is unsuitable.' In addition, Congress re-
94. The closest analogy is the requirement that legends warning of any transfer re-
strictions appear on stock certificates. See U.C.C. § 8-204(a) (Supp. 1991) (providing that
restrictions may be imposed by the issuer if .conspiciously" noted); Allen v. Biltmore
Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. 1957); Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1972).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6 (1991).
97. The rule prohibits brokers from selling certain "designated securities," (including
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cently adopted the Penny Stock Reform Act of 199098 which,
among other things, requires brokers selling "penny stocks" 99 to
disclose to customers the special risks associated with this mar-
ket.10°
Regulations that screen sales at the broker/dealer level may be
more cost-effective than the mandatory disclosure regime. First, for
the same reasons investors lack incentives to research securi-
ties, °1 they also will lack incentives to read lengthy disclosure
documents."° Second, securities act disclosure requirements may
be counter-productive if some investors rely too heavily on the
protection provided by federal law. Investors may not realize that
the SEC does not review many disclosure documents. Investors
may also fail to realize that the firms having the least to lose from
sanctions under the federal law are the firnms most likely to flout
it. 3 It is noteworthy that penny stock regulation was deemed
necessary for securities already subject to much of the mandatory
disclosure regime, including the 1933 Act's registration require-
ments.
equity securities that are not traded on a national securities exchange or NASDAQ, issued
by a registered investment company, or issued by a company having more than
$2,000,000 in net tangible assets, id. § 240.15c2-6(c), unless the brokers (1) obtain per-
sonal investment-related information from customers; (2) reasonably determine on the basis
of this information that transactions in these securities are suitable for those customers and
that the investors or their independent advisers are capable of evaluating the risks of such
transactions; (3) deliver a written statement to the customer setting forth the broker's
determination of suitability and stating that it is unlawful for the broker to sell the securi-
ty without such a written statement and the customer's written agreement; (4) obtain a
signed copy of the statement from the customer id. § 240.15c2-6(b), and (5) obtain from
the customers written agreements to the transactions which specify the identity and quanti-
ty of the security involved. Id. § 240.15c2-6(a). The rule exempts transactions in securities
having a price over $5.00 per share, transactions not recommended by the broker, and
transactions by non-market makers. Id. § 240.15c2-6(c).
98. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 951 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
99. The definition of "penny stock" in the amended Section 3(a)(51)(A) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(51)(A) (West Supp. 1991), is similar to that of "designated secu-
rity" under Rule 15c2-6. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
100. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(g).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
102. For a leading article questioning the efficacy of disclosure to ordinary, non-
professional investors, see Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and
Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1164-70 (1970).
103. This proposition is the corollary of the statement above that to avoid sending an
overly negative signal about the quality of their disclosures most firms will not opt out of
the securities laws. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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d. Limiting the Type of Transaction
A final alternative to a blanket prohibition of waiver is to limit
the option only to transactions which, by their nature, indicate that
investors are likely to know of and be able to assess the conse-
quences of waiver. This is the policy basis underlying the private
ordering approach to characterizing partnership interests as non-
"securities."' 04
4. Waiver of Anti-Fraud Provisions
The foregoing discussion applies generally to waiver of federal
affirmative disclosure rules, and in particular to those rules provid-
ed in the 1933 Act. There is an additional issue concerning the
propriety of distinguishing between affm-native disclosure and anti-
fraud provisions with regard to waiver. The anti-fraud rules are in-
tended to ensure a sort of "fall-back" or "safety net" protection for
investors. AS a result, waiver of these provisions should be regard-
ed suspiciously. However, the importance of this "safety net" to
investors is unclear since the anti-fraud rules do not vary substan-
tively from state common law fraud protection.'05 The principal
differences between state common law fraud and the federal anti-
fraud provisions arise in multi-state actions where there is concern
about the efficiency of state regulation"°6 and a need to facilitate
national common-questions litigation.'07 For the usually single-
state general partnership cases that are the focus of this article,
these particular concerns justifying the federal anti-fraud provisions
are relatively unimportant."°
Differences between waiving disclosure obligations in connec-
tion with an initial sale, and waiving anti-fraud and other obliga-
tions that operate throughout the life of the issuing company may
justify a distinction between 1933 Act affirmative disclosure re-
quirements and other disclosure or anti-fraud rules. Even if inves-
104. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
105. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring "scienter" for
Section 10(b) damage actions); see also, supra text accompanying note 76 (anti-fraud rules
do not provide affimative disclosure duty).
106. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying note 41.
108. Ironically, the general partnership case is the sort in which the anti-fraud remedy
has the most practical importance because an intrastate, private, or small-offering exemp-
tion from 1933 Act registration is commonly available.
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tors are in a position to assess waiver costs with respect to a par-
ticular disclosure document such as, for example, a 1933 Act regis-
tration statement, it might be argued that investors cannot deter-
mine the cost of waiving all future disclosures. Among other
things, while investors may trust the current insiders under current
conditions, they cannot assess the actions of future insiders under
future conditions. Thus, investors could not accurately price a
waiver provision that would operate during the indeterminate fu-
ture 1 9 Investors' inability to predict the future suggests that
waiver should be permitted only on a disclosure-by-disclosure
basis, and not for all future transactions by a firm, as would be the
case for any waiver rule operating through the definition of a "se-
curity." On the other hand, there is little reason to believe that
investors would under-discount, rather than over-discount, these
indeterminate risks, or that they would under-value the future bene-
fits of opting out of the mandatory disclosure regime. Moreover,
requiring repeated waivers would significantly increase the costs of
waiver, and may effectively force many firms to accept the costs
of mandatory disclosure.
B. Legal Recognition of the Private Ordering Approach
Section A discussed policy considerations for allowing at least
limited waivers of federal disclosure requirements. This section
shows that there is also legal recognition that private ordering is
sometimes effective in determining the application of the securities
laws.
1. Interpretation of Anti-Waiver Provisions
The securities laws explicitly provide that agreements waiving
compliance with them are ineffective.110 A broad interpretation of
these provisions might preclude the court from enforcing any
agreement that had the effect of a waiver, including parties' selec-
tion of a particular form of transaction. For instance, the court in
Roger v. Ilikon Corp."' construed an agreement providing that
the plaintiff was not relying on the promoter-defendants' represen-
109. For a similar argument against fiduciary duty waivers see John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1648-51 (1989).
110. See supra note 5.
111. 361 F.2d 260 (Ist Cir. 1966).
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tation as substantively, even if not formally, a waiver of the disclo-
sure requirements.112 The court said, "A party should not be per-
mitted to do indirectly that which he may not do directly." 113
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent decisions on arbitra-
tion support a narrower interpretation of the waiver provisions. In
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court held that
investors could be required, pursuant to their customer agreements,
to arbitrate claims against their brokers arising under Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act 14 and RICO.115  The Court interpreted the
statutory prohibitions on any agreement that requires the parties "to
waive compliance with any provision" of the securities laws 6 to
apply only to provisions that impose substantive obligations.117 In
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,118 the
Court overruled its earlier decision in Wilko v. Swann 9 and held
that investors could be forced to arbitrate a claim under an express
remedy. 1o
Thus, the Court in effect held, through restrictive interpretations
of the anti-waiver provision, that private agreements could modify
the application of the securities laws. Moreover, the Court found
that "[tihe voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant to this inqui-
ry" because the customer's contract law rights are not at issue.121
Thus, where the anti-waiver provision does not apply, the agree-
ment is enforceable to the full extent permitted under contract law,
without regard to the securities laws' supposed protection of pow-
erless investors."n
However, these cases provide only limited support for private
ordering. The Court's holdings favoring mandatory arbitration were
112. Id. at 268.
113. Id. at 267. See also Samuel A. Gruenbaum, Avoiding the Protection of the Federal
Securities Laws: The Anti-Waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 73 (1980)
(endorsing broad interpretations of sections 14 and 29(a)).
114. 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987).
115. Id. at 239.
116. See Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n; Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
117. 482 U.S. at 228-30.
118. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
119. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
120. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 479-85.
121. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230.
122. A strong dissent on this point chided the majority for ignoring the investor-
protection policy of the securities laws in its decision to enforce the agreement. Id. at 243
(Blaclanun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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based in part on the federal policy to the same effect expressed in
the Federal Arbitration Act,12 and in part on a finding that arbi-
tration adequately protects investors' substantive rights, particularly
in view of SEC oversight of brokerage agreements. 4 Thus, to
some extent the Court found securities law protection unnecessary.
2. Exemptions: The "Accredited Investor" Concept
The private ordering approach has also been endorsed through
the concept of "accredited investors" incorporated in the 1933
Act"z and in the SEC's Regulation D.12 "Accredited investors"
include certain institutional investors and insiders, as well as any
person with a net worth over $1,000,000 or individual annual in-
come over $200,000.127 SEC Regulation D essentially allows un-
registered sales of any amount of securities to any number of "ac-
credited investors."
128
The "accredited investor" exemption obviously is not condi-
tioned on a determination of whether the nature of the transaction
makes application of the mandatory disclosure rules appropriate. In
fact, the exemption applies even to a transaction clearly involving
"security"-type information and hundreds of investors. Rather, the
underlying theory holds that certain investors are in a position to
bargain for the information they need, and therefore those investors
should be allowed to opt out of the 1933 Act's registration require-
ments. This approach is consistent with this article's private order-
ing hypothesis.
123. The Court concluded that the preference for arbitration embodied in the Act justi-
fied placing on the party opposing arbitration the burden of establishing that Congress
intended through another federal statute to preclude resort to arbitration. See id. at 226-27.
124. Id. at 233.
125. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 2(15), 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (defining "accred-
ited investor") and § 77d(6) (providing for an exemption for transactions involving offers
or sales solely to "accredited investors").
126. See SEC Rules 501-08, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.508 (1991).
127. See SEC Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
128. See SEC Rule 501(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (-accredited investor" not included
in calculation of maximum number of purchasers allowed in offering); SEC Rule 502(b),
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (no information need be furnished to "accredited investor"); SEC
Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) ("accredited investors" need not meet
sophistication requirement for offers over $5,000,000).
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111. THE CASE OF GENERAL PARTNfERsHPS: MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE OR PRIVATE ORDERING?
This part applies the analysis above to general partnership
interests. It demonstrates that the general partnership cases are
more consistent with private-ordering than with mandatory-
disclosure analysis. Section A shows that the factors relating to the
mandatory disclosure approach support characterizing at least some
general partnerships as securities. Section B, on the other hand,
shows that the factors relating to the private ordering approach
justify characterizing general partnerships per se as non-securities.
Section C confirms the analysis of the preceding two sections by
showing that courts have moved toward a per se rule that general
partnerships are non-securities. Section D sets the private-ordering
perspective of partnership cases in sharp relief by contrasting these
cases with analogous non-partnership cases that emphasize
mandatory-disclosure policies.
A. The Mandatory Disclosure Approach
This section applies the traditional "mandatory-disclosure" tests
for defining a "security" to general partnership interests and dem-
onstrates that there are strong arguments for characterizing some
general partnership interests as "securities" under that approach.
This conclusion suggests that courts' broad exclusion of general
partnership interests, discussed below in section B, is explained at
least in part by factors other than the mandatory disclosure justifi-
cations reflected in the traditional tests - specifically, by the "pri-
vate ordering" approach proposed in this article.
1. Efforts of Others
A "standard form" general partnership would not meet the
"efforts of others" element of the Howey test because, under the
Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.), all partners participate equally in
the management of the firm. 29 Like most partnership law provi-
sions, however, the "equal participation" rule is subject to contrary
agreement.' 3° In many firms, such as real estate investment orga-
129. UNI. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
130. See id. (introduction states that "[the rights and duties of the partners in relation
to the partnership shall be determined [by the U.P.A.], subject to any agreement between
them").
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nizations, general partners delegate substantial authority to the pro-
moters who recruit them and who serve as managing partners.131
In these partnerships, the value of the partners' investments may be
just as dependent on the quality of management as the value of a
share in a publicly traded corporation. The fact that the promoter
may structure the deal so that investors have a formal right to con-
trol does not diminish the need for investor protection.32 Thus,
the partners' retention of a power to veto management decisions
should not necessarily prevent a "security" from existing. 33
2. Common Enterprise
Most general partnerships constitute "securities" under the
"common enterprise" test. They would qualify under "vertical com-
monality" because even managing partners often share the profits
generated, and under "horizontal commonality" because partners
typically share pro rata in the earnings of the firm.
To the extent that horizontal commonality is really a "multiple
investor" requirement, 134 that element would seem to be satisfied
at least in cases of larger syndications adopting the general partner-
ship form.
The personal liability arising inherently in the general partner-
ship form arguably cuts against classification as a "security" with
respect to at least one of the justifications for the multiple investor
requirement: that purchasers of small fractions of the firm lack
adequate incentives for research. On the other hand, even if each
partner has sufficient incentives for research, mandatory disclosure
may still be justified by the other rationale underlying the multiple
investor requirement: that disclosures by the firm avoid wasteful
131. The prevalence of centrally-managed general partnerships may seem puzzling be-
cause such firms do not use limited liability to facilitate passive ownership. Cf. Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Car. L.
REV. 89, 94 (1985) (explaining limited liability contracts partly on this basis). However,
for some finns, specialized management may not provide a benefit sufficient to offset the
cost of limited liability. In addition, the general partnership form may offer sufficient tax
advantages to offset costs of personal liability. See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 871-76
(showing how tax law may cause perverse selection of the partnership form).
132. See William 1. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's
Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMoRY LJ. 73, 93-95 (1981) (arguing that an
investor who lacks substantial knowledge of an enterprise's operations or who is not
offered management participation rights at the time of the investment should have the
interest classified as a security and be afforded protection of the securities laws).
133. See Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 80, at 522.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
[Vol. 42:1
PRIVATE ORDERING
duplication of research. Indeed, overproduction of information is
likely to be a more serious problem in the partnership context than
for other investments precisely because the risk of personal liability
increases the partners' incentives to research the firm before invest-
ing.
3. Application to Closely Held Finns
General partnerships are inherently closely held because person-
al liability makes free transferability of interests impractical.135
Although close ownership makes some of the rationales underlying
mandatory disclosure inapplicable, courts have not generally except-
ed closely held firms from the definition of "security." 13 6 Accord-
ingly, the closely held nature of general partnerships is not in itself
sufficient to justify characterizing general partnership interests as
non-"securities."
4. Protective Elements of the General Partnership Form
Even if general partnerships could be considered investment
contracts under Howey, they arguably should not be classified as
"securities" since various elements of the general partnership stan-
dard form significantly reduce the benefits of mandatory disclosure.
Protections offered by the partnership form might justify the sort of
implied exemption the Supreme Court has applied where purchasers
were protected, for example, by deposit insurance or by federal
retirement law.
37
Several characteristics of the partnership form support implied
exemption from the securities laws. First, the U.P.A. standard form
135. In order to enforce personal liability, shareholders must be prohibited from transfer-
ring that liability away. Otherwise, investors could transfer liability to low-asset holders on
the eve of bankruptcy. Where trading is allowed, personal liability inhibits transfer of
interests by encumbering every purchase with the additional assumption of a guarantee,
increasing the buyer's need for specific information about the company. Personal liability
forces creditors and co-shareholders to keep track of who owns a company's stock and
how wealthy these owners are, an undertaking which is more costly if stock is transfer-
able. For discussions of the effect of personal liability on transferability, see Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 131, at 95; Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law
and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1967); Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability
in the Theory of the Firm, 141 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 601, 602 (1985).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
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gives all partners equal rights to participate in management. 3
While the partners can contract around this right, the U.P.A. right
of equal participation fills any gaps remaining in the parties' ex-
plicit agreement.'39 Accordingly, partners may block any manage-
ment decision with which they disagree, and not only the sort of
major decisions on which corporate shareholders vote. Second, the
U.P.A. provides that all partners are entitled to full disclosure of
information about a firm.""4 Third, each partner has the power to
dissolve the partnership at will, 141 and to obtain on dissolution ei-
ther a pro rata share of proceeds from the sale of partnership prop-
erty142 or, if the partnership is continued after dissolution, the
value of the partner's interest in the firm. 43 These "voice" rights
can provide more potent protection than corporate shareholders'
power to "exit" by sale of their stock'" because the market price
of corporate stock necessarily reflects any prospective detriment to
holders resulting from their minority status. 45
These protections provided by the U.P.A. do not, however,
justify exempting general partnerships from the securities laws. Par-
ticipation in management does not provide an adequate substitute
for mandatory disclosure during the course of the business for
partners who are unsophisticated or uninformed. Participation is
irrelevant if the investor was expecting profits from the promoter's
efforts. Disclosure under the U.P.A. inadequately substitutes for
federal laws' mandates as to the detail and formatting of disclo-
sure. In all events, there is probably no duty of affirmative disclo-
sure between a promoter and one who is not yet a partner.14
138. See supra text accompanying note 129.
139. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PART-
NERsHIP, 6:40-41 (1988).
140. U.P.A. § 20, 6 U.L.A. 256.
141. Id. §§ 29, 31, 6 U.L.A. 364, 376.
142. Id. at § 38 (1), 6 U.L.A. 456 (any partner who has not wrongfully dissolved the
partnership can compel liquidation of the partnership business); Id. at § 40, 6 U.L.A. 468
(detailing the rules for distribution of partnership assets).
143. Id. at § 42, 6 U.L.A. 521; see also Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to
Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 357, 382-83 (1987).
144. As to trade-offs between "exit" and "voice" see supra note 71.
145. See William . Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Con-
trol Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 19 (1987) (noting that pro-
spective investors will discount shares when they are wary of a potential "squeeze out"
by a dominant shareholder).
146. See Walker v. Patterson, 208 N.W. 3 (Minn. 1926); Waite on Behalf of Bretton
Woods Acquisition Co. v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619 (N.H. 1989); Densmore Oil Co. v.
Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 139, at 6:63,
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Even the partners' power to compel dissolution and liquidation
or buyout is insufficient to warrant withdrawing securities law
protection. The power may be materially qualified by penalties
should a partner dissolve prior to the expiration of a term or un-
dertaking, 147 or where the agreement includes a non-competition
clause or provides for a payment .on dissolution of significantly
less than the full value of the partner's interest.148 Even the
power to receive a full pro rata share does not fully redress the
frustrated expectations of a partner who was misled about the pros-
pects of the venture.
5. Summary
The above discussion shows that the traditional elements of the
definition of "security" do not support characterizing general part-
nership interests as per se non-"securities." To the extent that the
definition of "security" turns on policies justifying mandatory dis-
closure, exclusion is appropriate only for particular partnerships in
which, for example, the efforts of others or common enterprise
elements of the Howey test are not met. Thus, to the extent that
the courts have recognized a per se exemption for general partner-
ships,149 this section points to some basis for those decisions oth-
er than the mandatory-disclosure approach. That basis is the pri-
vate-ordering approach discussed in the next section.
B. Application of Private Ordering Approach to
General Partnerships
Under the mandatory-disclosure approach to defining "securi-
ty,""0 partnership interests would be securities where, for exam-
ple, several relatively passive investors rely on the efforts of man-
aging partners, irrespective of whether those partners had a techni-
cal power to control the firm. This determination would depend on
the facts of the particular transaction. Under the private ordering
approach, on the other hand, general partnership interests would be
per se non-"securities" based entirely on the investors' selection of
147. U.P.A. § 38(2), 6 U.L.A. 456 (providing that on wrongful dissolution, the dissolv-
ing partner is liable for damages and is not entitled to the value of goodwill in the com-
putation of the interest).
148. See BRONMERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 139, at 7:142-146 (discussing the extent to
which courts are willing to enforce such agreements).
149. See Section 11(C), infra notes 165-216.
150. See Section 1(A), supra notes 81-109.
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the partnership form, irrespective of whether, under the particular
circumstances, investors needed the protection of the securities
laws. This section demonstrates that it is appropriate to apply the
private ordering approach to define general partnership interests as
"securities." Subsection 1 offers policy arguments supporting this
approach, while subsection 2 shows how its application is consis-
tent with the statutory definition.of "security."
1. Policy Considerations
Characterizing partnership interests as per se non-"securities"
under the private ordering approach would address the principal
policy objections to enforcing waivers of the securities laws.'
First, questions of whether notice of the waiver were brought home
to the investor are mitigated by embedding the waiver in the un-
mistakable structure of the deal. Obviously, investors need only a
cursory understanding of the agreement to know whether they are
participating in a general partnership. Thus, once it is clear that the
securities laws do not apply to such investments, purchasers in
both the primary and secondary markets can be expected to be
aware of the waiver without having to read a detailed agreement.
Investors would have notice of the non- application of the securi-
ties laws not only from case law reaching this result, but also
because the result follows logically from a conventional, and there-
fore widely understood, approach to the definition of "security."
Second, because the waiver is an inherent part of the deal,
investors are in a position to evaluate non-coverage by the securi-
ties laws and negotiate non-coverage along with the other aspects
of the partnership agreement. By contrast, if the waiver is brought
to the attention of the purchaser only in the final agreement, it
may come after considerable negotiations and unregulated selling
effort that may cause the investor to discount or disregard the
absence of securities regulation.
Third, use of the general partnership form inherently mitigates
potential problems of investors being unable to understand the
151. See supra text accompanying notes 81-93. while this analysis justifies permitting
the parties to use the general partnership form to waive application of the securities laws,
it also justifies enforcing parties' bargains, evidenced through a provision in the partner-
ship agreement, to have securities laws apply. This is the effect of the Supreme Court's
recognition that use of the "stock" format rather than the asset-purchase format in the sale
of a business automatically triggers application of the securities laws. See infra text ac-
companying notes 217-48.
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effect of a securities law waiver. Irrespective of the specific terms
adopted by general partners, the partners are personally liable for
the debts of the business. 152 Thus, only investors who are willing
to risk personal liability participate in general partnership deals. 
15
This willingness to accept risk provides the same sort of assurance
of sophistication that is provided by the wealth and net income
criteria for "accredited investor" status. 54
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that allowing investors
to opt out of the securities laws by selecting the general partner-
ship form does not exalt form over substance in the sense that the
elements of the general partnership form are related to policy con-
cerns with waiver. This distinguishes the significance of choice of
form for securities law purposes from tax rules on choice of form
that are either irrelevant to or perversely inconsistent with gover-
nance objectives.' 55
2. Statutory Considerations
The private ordering approach to defining general partnerships
as non-"securities" is consistent with the "conventional" view of a
security, which focuses on the parties' expectations rather than on
the underlying policies of the act." The principle identifying
feature of conventional securities is their embodiment in a docu-
ment or certificate." The statutory definition itself includes this
feature: "security" includes, for example, a "certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement" rather than a
"profit-sharing agreement. " 158 In this context, certification is sig-
nificant not as a check on fraud or as a method of notifying third
parties, but because it facilitates transferability of interests. Certif-
152. U.P-.A § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174.
153. Although investors in close corporations often put their entire capital at stake,
many close corporations, unlike general partnerships, also have small, passive investors
who have only a limited stake in the business. Consequently, a per se rule is not justified
for close corporations on private ordering grounds. See supra text accompanying notes
105-09.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
155. See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 871-77.
156. The private ordering approach is similar to that applied by the Supreme Court in
the sale-of-business and note cases. See infra text accompanying notes 217-48.
157. 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 854 (2d ed. 1989), defines "security" as follows:
"10. A document held by a creditor as guarantee of his right to payment. Hence any par-
ticular kind of stock, shares, or other forms of investment guaranteed by such documents.
Also, in the U.S., such a document issued to investors to finance a business venture."
158. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (emphasis added).
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ication accomplishes this by providing transferees with clear notice
of the holder's voting and financial share, rather than forcing the
transferee to determine these rights by examining the company's
books. In other words, as commonly understood, a "security" is an
interest in an enterprise capable of being traded.
The common understanding of a general partnership interest
does not conform to this conventional meaning of "security." Al-
though general partnership agreements often are written, they need
not be, and they are rarely represented by transferable certificates.
Moreover, non-transferability is inherent in the partnership
form.159 The U.P.A. provides that all partners must consent to the
admission of new partners."6 Although this provision is subject
to the partners' contrary agreement,161 partners normally would
expect to be able to veto admission of new partners in light of
their potential personal liability for contracts or other acts of their
co-partners. Partners may assign their financial interests in the firm
without co-partner consent.62 However, because these interests
carry no management rights, there is usually little market for
them. 63 Even if these partnership interests were freely traded,
this activity would generate a market for only a portion of
partners' rights under their partnership agreements.
Under the conventional definition of a "security," the mere fact
that parties have selected the general partnership form indicates that
they do not expect to be covered by the securities laws even if
mandatory disclosure is arguably appropriate as a policy mat-
ter."6 The central thesis of this article is that this choice of form
159. Non-transferability distinguishes general partnership interests from stock in such
corporations. While stock in closely held corporations often is not readily marketable, all
corporate stock is presumptively freely transferable. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 288
N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (refusing to enforce a consent restriction on transfer of stock in a two-
person corporation because it was inconsistent with the rule against unreasonable restraints
on alienation of personal property), aff'd mem., 244 N.E.2d 469 (N.Y. 1968).
160. U.P.A. § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213.
161. See id. § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213.
162. Id. § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. 353.
163. Assignees have only the right to seek judicial dissolution of a partnership where
there is no remaining term or uncompleted undertaking. Id. §§ 27(1), 32(2), 6 U.L.A.
353, 394.
164. Had courts clearly and consistently applied the mandatory disclosure approach to
general partnership interests and determined on that basis that those interests were "secu-
rities," this judicial precedent arguably would have shaped investors' expectations. But, as
discussed in Section I1(C), see infra text accompanying notes 165-216, the courts never
applied the mandatory disclosure approach more than tentatively in a few early cases. In
any event, because application of the mandatory disclosure approach to general partner-
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is tantamount to a contractual waiver of securities law coverage.
It is not essential to the contractual characterization of form
choice that either of the parties purposely selected the partnership
form in order to avoid the securities laws, or even that the parties
were aware of the consequences of their choice of form with re-
spect to securities law coverage. In either of these situations there
would be a contract in which legal default rules rather than explicit
intentions fill in blank terms.
C. General Partnership Interests as Non-Securities
This section traces the evolution of cases evaluating general
partnership interests as securities and shows a change from a fact-
specific, mandatory-disclosure approach to a per se rule that gener-
al partnerships are non-securities. The rule which has developed is
consistent with the private ordering approach advocated in this
article.
1. Pre-Williamson Cases
The law on general partnership interests as securities began
with the assumption that the Howey analysis would apply in this
context as it had been applied to other purported investment con-
tracts. An early article on the subject argued that a general partner-
ship would be a security if the general partners were sufficiently
passive or uninvolved in management that they could be deemed to
be investing in the efforts of others." The author extended this
analysis even to large professional firms, such as law, accbunting
or brokerage partnerships in which the partners made financial
investments."
The leading case on general partnership interests as securities
during this period, Pawgan v. Silverstein, did not really test this
ships would turn on the circumstances of particular cases, investors would be unable to
form clear expectations concerning coverage. More importantly, the private ordering ap-
proach is based not merely on investor expectations, but on the notion that investors
should be able to choose non-coverage of the securities laws by selecting the general
partnership form. In that respect, the private ordering approach is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's holdings that corporate stock is per se a "security," which, in effect, per-
mits investors to choose the coverage of securities laws. See infra text accompanying
notes 217-48.
165. Joseph C. Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership and Joint Venture Interests as
Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 581, 613-15 (1972).
166. Id. at 614.
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assumption.167 In Pawgan, three promoters acquired a motel,
leased it back to the seller and then assigned the contract to a
partnership in which the promoters participated as managing part-
ners with seventeen other partners. The non-managing partners
provided ninety percent of the financing for the firm. Apart from
the fact that a majority vote of the partners would be required to
approve sale or refinancing of the property, the non-managing
partners had no role in management!" The managing partners
were even given the power to admit new partners without a vote
by the other partners. In fact, the powers of the general partners in
the Pawgen firm did not differ from those of the limited partners
in another of the promoters' firMs.
169
The court seems to have been persuaded that the firm was, in
substance, a limited rather than a general partnership. It referred to
the firm as a "syndication," saying, "[ilt is obvious that this ven-
ture was not a general partnership in the accepted sense, and call-
ing it one does not properly reflect its real business form."' 70
Without further discussion, the court went on to hold that the
partnership was "either [a] certificate of interest or participation in
a profit sharing agreement or investment contract, and therefore a
security.
"i 7
1
A case at the other extreme from Pawgan decided during the
same period is Oxford Finance Co. v. Harvey." The Harvey
court found no "security" in a two-party joint venture in which the
plaintiff had the substantial managerial control characteristic of a
joint venture. "'
Hirsch v. duPont is the most interesting pre-Williamson case
because it proved to be an important precursor to the special per
se rule ultimately applied in general partnership cases. 74 In
Hirsch, the plaintiffs purchased general partnership interests in
167. 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
168. Id. at 900. The Pawgan court derived these facts from an opinion issued in an
earlier, related case, United States v. Silverstein, 237 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 344
F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1965). In Silverstein, the court held that the partnership was sufficient-
ly impersonal that the Fifth Amendment would not protect the managing partners from
having to produce partnership papers. Silverstein, 237 F. Supp. at 449-50.
169. Id. at 447.
170. Pawgan, 265 F. Supp. at 900.
171. Id.
172. 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
173. Id. at 434. See also Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973) (interests
in a partnership of three families are not securities).
174. 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
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connection with a sale of their firm to DuPont, Glore Forgan &
Co. The court held that these interests were not securities under
Howey because, although general management power was formally
delegated to a management committee, each partner had a real
power to participate in management, and in fact actively participat-
ed. 5 As a separate ground for its decision, the court held that,
unlike Pawgan, the Hirsch enterprise was a partnership "in the
accepted sense" because the partnership interests were not freely
transferable, the interests were not offered to the public, and the
plaintiffs had professional and business relationships with the other
partners.1
76
The Hirsch court's stress on the formal elements of general
partnership is arguably consistent with application of a per se rule.
One indication of the court's formal approach is its ruling that
limited partnership interests in the same firm, owned by the same
plaintiffs, were securities based on the circumscribed statutory
rights of limited partners. However, the court also employed a
standard Howey analysis by emphasizing that the plaintiffs were
among the largest holders of voting units and so "were clearly in a
position to seek a majority for their position, and thereby exercise
managerial control over the firm."1"
Thus, at this stage of the case law development, the question
for the courts was whether an investment formally structured as a
general partnership interest and not merely a disguised limited
partnership would be (a) a non-"security" per se; or (b) a "securi-
ty" under the Howey analysis if the investors delegated substantial
management power to one or more managing partners.
2. Williamson v. Tucker
In Williamson v. Tucker, a promoter offered investments in a
real estate development project in the form of three joint ventures
with approximately fifteen venturers in each.17 The promotional
175. 396 F. Supp. at 1221-22. In reaching its conclusion about the nonexistence of
securities, the Hirsch court also relied on New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F.
Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the "security" issue arose in the unusual context of
general partners of a brokerage firm seeking standing to sue for a violation of stock
exchange rules arising partly out of the partners' breach of their supervision duties. The
Sloan court ruled that the partners lacked standing, basing its decision in part on the
ground that allowing suit would not encourage compliance with the rules. Id. at 1315.
176. Hirsch, 396 F. Supp. at 1226.
177. Id. at 1222.
178. 645 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
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materials emphasized that the promoter would "aggressively pur-
sue] all zoning and proper land planning efforts to assure the
maximum profit potential of each investment.""' There was
strong evidence that the investors would be relying on the
promoter's efforts. However, the joint venture agreements clearly
gave the investors substantial management power, including author-
ity to approve new development proposals and to remove the pro-
moter as manager."W The case, therefore, squarely presented the
question left open after Hirsch.
The Williamson court applied essentially a two-part analysis.
First, it determined that the firm was a bona fide joint venture.1"'
Unlike Pawgun, the partners had real power which was not diluted
by the offering of a large number of interests. In this situation, the
court said, an investor "should be on notice ... that the federal
securities acts will not protect him from a mere failure to exercise
his rights."1" This first step of the Williamson analysis is orient-
ed toward investor expectations arising from the form of their
investments.
But then the court ruled that, in order for the plaintiff to prove
the investment was a security, the plaintiff had to show that "he
was so dependent on the promoter or on a third party that he was
in fact unable to exercise meaningful partnership powers.""3 The
court summarized its test as follows:
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be desig-
nated a security if the investor can establish, for example,
that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little
power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the
arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited
partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperi-
enced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or ven-
ture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so dependent
on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership
179. 645 F.2d at 408.
180. Id. at 408-09.
181. Id. at 407-09.
182. Id. at 422.
183. Id. at 424.
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or venture powers.'
At first glance, the second and third prongs of the Williamson
test seem to apply Howey. Upon closer analysis, it is not clear the
court relied on Howey. The Williamson court observed that an
investor in a bona fide partnership has "an extremely difficult
factual burden"'85 to establish that the interest is a security and
indicated that the plaintiff in the case before it failed that task.
1
The Williamson plaintiffs' general business expertise and past in-
vestments in similar ventures made characterization of the interests
as "securities" inappropriate under the second prong of the court's
test. ' With respect to the third prong, the court concluded that
even if the plaintiffs had relied on the promoter, they failed to
prove that the promoter was uniquely capable managing the part-
nership and, therefore, irreplaceable. This aspect of the test is not
only very difficult to satisfy, 8 but it is also inconsistent with the
Howey "efforts of others" test. As long as the facts show that
investors expect a profit from a particular promoter's managerial
efforts (as appeared to be the case in Williamson), the investors'
power to remove the promoter should be as irrelevant in determin-
ing the existence of a "security," as corporate shareholders' right to
vote out current management.18 9
Thus, Williamson comes very close to holding that a bona fide
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 424. Notwithstanding the court's conclusion that the partnership interests
were not "securities," it found the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction improper. At the time of the dismissal, "neither the Supreme Court nor [the
Fifth Circuit] had considered the effect of meaningful powers retained by joint venturers
on the inclusion of joint venture interests within the investment contract concept." Id. at
425. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were not "immaterial" or "wholly insubstantial and
frivolous." Id. at 426.
187. For other cases finding plaintiffs sufficiently sophisticated to pass the second prong
of Williamson, see Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1986); Roark v.
Belvedere, Ltd., 633 F. Supp. 765, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1985). For cases holding that the
plaintiff had raised fact issues as to unsophistication see Stewart v. Germany, 631 F.
Supp. 236, 240 (S.D. Miss. 1986); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F.
Supp. 781, 786 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
188. For another case holding that the plaintiff was not dependent on the promoter's
unique skills see Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346-47. For cases holding that plaintiffs had
raised factual issues about dependency see Stewart, 631 F. Supp. at 240; Gordon v. Terry,
684 F.2d 736, 743 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
189. See Carney, supra note 7, at 322 n.44 ("The [Williamson] court failed to no-
tice ... that these requirements for a lack of practical control go beyond the lack of
control of ordinary shareholders.")
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general partnership interest is per se not a security even if the
Howey factors are satisfied. The case is therefore more consistent
with an expectations-based private ordering approach than with a
mandatory-disclosure approach oriented toward assessments of
transactions as appropriate or inappropriate for federal disclosure
rules.
3. Goodwin v. Elkins & Co.'90
In Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., a Third Circuit panel issuing
three separate opinions unanimously concluded that a general part-
nership interest in a stock brokerage firm structured as a limited
partnership was not a "security."19'
Referring only to the partners' powers and personal liability
under the applicable partnership statute, Judge Garth held that
plaintiff's partnership interest was not a "security" as a matter of
law. He said:
[i]t is manifest that any person who possesses the powers,
rights, and responsibilities described [in the statute] cannot
have invested his capital with the expectation of profits de-
rived solely from the efforts of others, and therefore cannot
be the holder of a "security" as intended by the Act. What-
ever subjective perceptions Goodwin may have entertained
about his position in the firm, and whatever may have been
the role he actually assumed, the legal interest which he
enjoyed does not fall within the scope of the term "securi-
ty" as intended by Congress.' 92
Judge Garth refused to adopt the Williamson rule, noting that it
was "inapposite" because it assessed dismissal based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 93 Nonetheless, Judge Garth proceeded
to consider the plaintiff's Williamson argument and rejected the
190. 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
191. Id. at 103. Judge Garth wrote the opinion announcing the judgment of the court;
Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Becker wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 100, 111
& 113. The judges' divergence of opinion was precipitated by the plaintiff's failure to
attach a copy of the partnership agreement to his complaint. Chief Judge Seitz argued that
the defendant's motion should have been viewed as a motion for summary judgment, id
at 111, while Judge Becker concluded that the motion was properly treated as a motion
to dismiss. Id. at 113. Judge Garth found it unnecessary to decide that issue. Id. at 104
n.9.
192. Id. at 104 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 106 n.11. See supra note 191.
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plaintiff's contention that the partnership agreement reduced his
power to that of a limited partner. The court concluded:
"[w]hatever may have been the effect of the Partnership Agree-
ment, we are not persuaded that it could so diminish the statutory
powers of a general partner in the partnership, such as Goodwin,
that the partnership interest which he possessed could qualify as a
security."" While Judge Garth recognized that the agreement
could modify the partners' statutory rights in some respects, he
found that the agreement could not take away the partners' agency
power and personal liability, saying: "Even if the Elkins Partner-
ship Agreement contained the most draconian restrictions on the
rights of non-management partners therefore, such partners would
still possess a quantum of powers and responsibilities which, as a
matter of law, would preclude their interest from being considered
a security under the Act." 95 Moreover, this remained true even
in a firm with many general partners:
If we were to consider a large Wall Street law firm with
54 partners, as contrasted with a small close corporation of
only 20 shareholders, we still would find the latter to com-
prise a "security" but not the former. General partners, no
matter how many or few they may be, are still, as a group,
legally responsible for the management of the firm."
Judges Seitz and Becker also held that no "security" existed,
but based their opinions on the plaintiff's substantial powers under
the partnership agreement. Both judges found that the plaintiff had
not sufficiently alleged facts outside the agreement to support the
existence of a "security," but they disagreed slightly over what
facts would be sufficient. Judge Seitz noted that the plaintiff had
not alleged that he was denied management power provided in the
contract. Furthermore, he concluded that an allegation that the man-
aging partner usurped power not provided in the partnership agree-
ment was not enough to make the plaintiff's interest a security.
Similarly Judge Becker noted that plaintiff "ha[d] not alleged that
the [agreement's] provisions . . . were shams. 197
Goodwin steps closer than Williamson toward accepting the
private ordering theory. Judge Garth's opinion goes a long way in
194. Id. at 107.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 107 n.14.
197. Id. at 114.
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this direction by holding that a statutory general partnership neces-
sarily is not a security. As discussed in Part III (A), this position
cannot be justified on the ground that a standard form partnership
is per se an inappropriate subject of mandatory disclosure regula-
tion.' 98 While Judges Seitz and Becker appear to take an ap-
proach more like that in Howey, their opinions also moved toward
a per se approach and away from Williamson by emphasizing the
terms of the agreement rather than plaintiff's actual dependence on
the promoter.
4. Post-Goodwin Cases: A Compromise Approach
Recent cases have struggled over whether to adopt the per se
approach employed by Judge Garth in Goodwin, the more fact-
sensitive queries of the second and third prongs of Williamson, or
the Seitz-Becker approach in Goodwin of relying primarily on the
partnership agreement to determine whether or not application of
the securities laws is warranted.
In Matek v. Murat several investors converted a Navy vessel
into a fish processing plant.199 The majority opinion, upholding
summary judgment for the defendants on the "security" issue,
explicitly rejected what it termed Judge Garth's "bright line" test in
Goodwin in favor of what it termed "economic reality." 20° The
court also rejected the second and third prongs of Williamson,
finding that those tests "create uncertainty" by requiring the pro-
moter to investigate the sophistication of all investors and could
lead to the "untenable" result that in the same offering some in-
vestors are buying "securities" and others are not.01
The Matek majority applied only the first prong of Williamson,
which requires a determination of whether an agreement is properly
characterized a general partnership rather than a disguised limited
partnership, and found the agreement before the court a bona fide
general partnership. Therefore, the court concluded, the agreement
was not a security even though it delegated power to managing
partners because the non-managing partners could consult with the
managing partners, could veto decisions on important matters and
198. See supra text accompanying notes 129-49.
199. 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
200. Id. at 727.
201. Id. at 729.
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had access to information.2°2
Judge Canby, concurring, argued that the court could not prop-
erly determine "economic reality" without looking outside the
agreement to see whether the investors were unsophisticated or had
depended on the promoter.2° However, he agreed with the result
reached by the majority because he found undisputed evidence that
the plaintiffs were active and sophisticated participants.0"
A recent Ninth Circuit panel opinion in a partnership "security"
case leaves some uncertainty about the authority of Matek. In Koch
v. Hankins, 5 the court held that Matek had been implicitly re-
jected by Hocking v. DuBois,an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion
in a non-partnership case. As a result, the court reversed a summa-
ry judgment for defendant on the "security" issue, reasoning that
there were fact issues as to plaintiffs' sophistication and reliance on
the promoter's expertise under the second and third Williamson
factors. Other panels in the Ninth Circuit may not agree that Hock-
ing implicitly rejected Matek.207 In any event, Koch's holding is
consistent with Matek's "economic reality" test. Koch involved 35
partnerships that collectively controlled a single jojoba plantation.
Irrespective of a plaintiff's sophistication or actual reliance on the
promoter, he arguably did not legally control the firm as distin-
guished from his own partnership.
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., in-
volved a general partnership of 23 partners and a managing partner
which was formed to own and lease fishing boats.208 The court,
in an opinion written by former Justice Lewis Powell, affirmed
summary judgment for defendants on the security issue.21 It re-
lied primarily on the non-managing partners' extensive access to
information and voting powers provided under both the partnership
agreement and Virginia partnership law, as well as the fact that the
partners actually exercised these rights by replacing managers.10
202. Id. at 731.
203. Id. at 734-35.
204. Id. at 735.
205. 928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991).
206. 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 255-259 (dis-
cussing Hocking).
207. See infra at text accompanying note 259 (arguing that Hocking should not be so
interpreted).
208. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 242.
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Although the Rivanna court said that the presumption against
the existence of a "security" which arises from these agreed powers
could "be rebutted by evidence that it [was] not possible for the
partners to exercise those powers,"211 the court explicitly rejected
application of Williamson's second and third prongs. The court
reasoned that the Williamson approach, "to the extent it requir[ed]
a court to look to the actual knowledge and business expertise of
each partner, ... would unduly broaden the scope of the Supreme
Court's instruction that courts must examine the economic reality
of partnership interests." 212 The court later said the fact that some
of the partners may have been unsophisticated would not affect the
outcome because those partners could always have gotten advice
from other partners or third parties.213 Finally, the court did not
preclude the possibility that a finding of non-"security" could be
based on state partnership law, even if the partners' powers under
the agreement had been weaker.214
Subject to the uncertainty left by Koch, Matek and, Rivanna
indicate significant support for the "private ordering" theory. These
cases show that a general partnership is not a "security" at least
where the partnership agreement gives the members general part-
ner-like powers, irrespective of the partners' actual dependence on
the promoter. 2" The selection of the general partnership form
therefore controls to a significant extent, although even a bona fide
general partnership agreement might be a "security" if it is sold
widely to many dispersed investors whose effective ability to con-
trol the managers is no greater than that of corporate sharehold-
ers.
2 16
D. The General Partnership Cases in Context
This Section further supports the emerging emphasis on private
ordering over mandatory disclosure policies in the partnership cases
211. Id. at 241.
212. Id. at 241 n.7.
213. Id. at 242 n.10.
214. See id. at 241 n.6 (noting that because the partnership agreement conferred broad
powers on the general partners, the court would not consider the effect of state law in
the case before it).
215. See also Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
216. See SEC v. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that joint
venture interests were securities, despite a provision in the agreement empowering inves-
tors to participate in major decisions, where the interests were sold through seminars to
approximately fifteen hundred investors in thirty states).
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by considering two types of analogous cases. Section 1 discusses
the Supreme Court's recent decisions characterizing "stock" in the
sale of a business as a "security" per se. Section 2 contrasts the
partnership cases with others involving the "investment contract"
issue.
1. Stock and Notes as Per Se Securities
The Supreme Court's rule that stock and notes are securities
without regard to the outcome of a Howey analysis supports an
emphasis on the form of the investment in characterizing partner-
ships as non-securities. The Court has recognized in stock and note
cases that the formal aspects of an investment may constitute a sort
of agreement to opt into the securities laws. It should follow from
this conclusion that, as argued in this article, the form of the in-
vestment may also support a kind of securities law waiver as
well.21
7
The history of the Court's treatment of "stock" and "notes"
begins with United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, in which
the Court upheld dismissal of securities law claims brought by
residents of a cooperative housing project whose ownership interest
in their apartments was evidenced by "stock."211 Even though
"stock" is explicitly listed in the statutory definition of a "securi-
ty," the Court held that "form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality." 219 Following
this approach the Court concluded that the shares lacked the ordi-
217. This proposition is consistent with the statutory language defining a "security" as
"any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Securities Act of 1933,
§ 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78c(a)(10). This language suggests an emphasis on the form of the transaction regard-
less of whether, as a matter of "economic reality," the mandatory disclosure rules should
apply. One writer characterizes the statutes as approaching the definition of a "security"
"in a conventional manner." Carney, supra note 7, at 317. I suggest that the use of a
"conventional" approach amounts to an emphasis on form over substance.
This conclusion is subject to the qualification that the Supreme Court may have been
less concerned about problems with over-extension of the securities laws (in the sale-of-
business context) than under-application (to partnerships). However, this characterization of
the Court's concerns would be inconsistent with its restrictive view of the application of
federal securities laws over the last fifteen years. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring deceptive conduct for Section 10(b) action); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (applying scienter standard under Section 10(b) of
1934 Act); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (imposing
purehaser-seller standing requirement for suits under Section 10(b)).
218. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
219. Id. at 848 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
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nary characteristics of securities, including a right to dividends,
negotiability, voting rights and possibility of appreciation in value.
Accordingly, the Court applied Howey factors in determining
whether the investment was a security.
The most important aspect of Forman, when viewed in the
light of later cases, was not the Court's willingness to disregard
form, but rather was its recognition that form can be important in
appropriate circumstances. The Court said:
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name such
as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to
assume that the federal securities laws apply. This would
clearly be the case when the underlying transaction embod-
ies some of the significant characteristics typically associat-
ed with the named instrument.
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor
could they, that they were misled by use of the word
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws gov-
erned their purchase. Common sense suggests that people
who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in a
state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are not
likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing invest-
ment securities simply because the transaction is evidenced
by something called a share of stock.'
Significantly, the Court gave as its reason for considering the form
of transactions the policy of upholding investor expectations.
After Forman, some cases interpreted that decision as holding
that stock with the usual attributes of conventional common stock
was a "security" irrespective of Howey.Y Other courts empha-
sized "economic reality" and applied a Howey-type analysis even to
cases involving ordinary common stock.' Under the latter ap-
proach, "sale-of-business" cases arguably would be non-securities.
220. Id. at 850-51.
221. E.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the purchase
of 100 percent of a small business was a securities transaction).
222. E.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
purchase of assets and stock in a corporation was not a securities transaction because the
purchaser took control of the business).
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Although the buyer's post-sale control of the enterprise does not
itself guarantee access to information in connection with the pur-
chase, the securities laws guarantee full disclosure only where the
special information problems connected with "securities" are in-
volved. Arguably, no such problems exist where the purchaser
expects profits after the sale to come from her own managerial
efforts rather than from her reliance on another's efforts.'
The Supreme Court resolved the uncertainty concerning com-
mon stock in the companion cases of Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth" and Gould v. Ruefenacht.2  The Court held that the
sale of ordinary common stock, whether it involved all of the com-
mon stock of a business (Landreth) or only fifty percent of the
stock (Gould), involved the sale of a "security" without regard to a
Howey analysis.
The Court's policy rationale for these decisions was consistent
with this article's private ordering interpretation. 6 Most impor-
tantly, the Court stressed the expectations of the parties. Comparing
the conventional stock in Landreth to the cooperative housing inter-
ests involved in Forman, the Court observed that it was "much
more likely here than in Forman that an investor would believe he
was covered by the federal securities laws." 7 Similarly, when
the Court compared stock with notes it concluded that "traditional
stock 'represents to many people, both trained and untrained in
business matters, the paradigm of a security.' Thus persons trading
in traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their activi-
ties are governed by the Acts."22' The Landreth Court also em-"
223. As Judge Posner reasoned in one sale-of-business case, the purpose of the securi-
ties laws is to protect "investors" rather than "entrepreneurs." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d
197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982). On the other hand, the purchaser of control arguably needs
securities-type disclosures to evaluate the value of the company's "goodwill," including the
quality of the company's managerial infra-structure.
224. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
225. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
226. In addition to policies discussed in the text, the Court also reasoned that "the plain
meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" sub-
ject to the coverage of the Acts." Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687. This rationale is inherently
suspect, since words do not have absolute meaning isolated from context. See Posner,
supra note 6, at 262-69. Criticism of the "plain meaning" approach is particularly apt
with regard to the statutory definition of a "security," which is qualified by the lead-in
"unless the context otherwise requires." See Carney, supra note 7, at 333-34 (noting that
the "context" clause has facilitated use of a "public interest" approach to interpreting the
definition of a "security").
227. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687.
228. Id. at 693 (quoting Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1983)). This
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phasized the need for clarity and predictability of laws associated
with a transaction. It said that applying the "sale of a business"
doctrine would make "coverage by the Acts . . . in most cases . . .
unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was
sold" 9 because whether or not the "stock" was a "security"
would depend on whether the purchaser acquired control.' The
Court noted in its Gould opinion that control would turn not only
on the percentage of stock being purchased, but also on specific
voting rights or the purchaser's expectations of being involved in
management."1 The need for clarity and predictability .was a cen-
tral theme of the Gould opinion, and apparently explains why the
Court chose to review both 50% and 100% sales at the same time.
Even more significant than the Court's emphasis on clarity and
predictability, however, is that the Court related these policies to
private ordering. In response to the defendant's argument that per
se application of the securities laws to "stock" would increase
courts' workloads, the Landreth Court said: "[w]e find more daunt-
ing.., the prospect that parties to a transaction may never know
whether they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extend-
ed discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the
passage of control."232 In Gould the Court left no mistake why
parties' expectations are important: "[T]he parties' inability to
determine at the time of the transaction whether the Acts apply
neither serves the Acts' protective purpose nor permits the purchas-
er to compensate for the added risk of no protection when negoti-
ating the transaction. ' '1 3 Thus, the Court has plainly opted for an
approach conducive to the parties' contracting for protection of the
securities laws over an approach more consistent with the policies
underlying mandatory disclosure.'"
observation by the Landreth Court signifies an apparent shift in emphasis from the
Court's statement in Forman that "we do not suggest that the name [of the instrument] is
wholly irrelevant." Forman, 421 U.S. at 850. Note that Landreth reversed some earlier
cases that had applied Howey in sale-of-business cases. See supra note 224 and accom-
panying text. Thus, the Court seems to conclude that that legal rule should not be
deemed to have shaped the parties' expectations about application of the securities laws.
See supra note 171 (arguing for this outcome).
229. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696.
230. Id.
231. Gould, 471 U.S. at 705. In Gould itself, this determination would have been com-
plicated by the fact that plaintiff was promised a right to participate in control subject to
the president's veto.
232. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696-97.
233. Gould, 471 U.S. at 706.
234. Id. Justice Stevens' dissent in Landreth further demonstrates that the Court deliber-
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In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court continued to emphasize
private-ordering over the "economic reality"-type Howey approach
when it held that demand notes are "notes" within the statutory
definition of a security and, therefore, covered by the securities
laws without regard to Howey."5 The Reves Court's analysis was
more complex than its opinion with respect to "stock" because, as
the Court had pointed out in Landreth, 6 the public perception
regarding the "security"-like nature of notes was not as clear as
that regarding "stock." For example, under a literal reading of the
Securities Acts, a consumer note financing the purchase of a wash-
ing machine would involve the sale of a "security." 7 Thus, the
Court articulated standards for determining when "notes" were not
securities. Significantly, as in Landreth, these standards emphasize
the public's expectations rather than facts bearing on whether man-
218datory disclosure is appropriate.
ately endorsed a private-ordering approach in Gould and Landreth. Justice Stevens articu-
lated the position rejected by the majority:
[I]t is only a matter of interest to the parties whether the transaction takes the
form of a sale of stock or a sale of assets, and the decision usually hinges on
matters that are irrelevant to the federal securities laws such as tax liabilities,
the assignability of Government licenses or other intangible assets, and the allo-
cation of the accrued or unknown liabilities of the going concern. If Congress
had intended to provide a remedy for every fraud in the sale of a going con-
cem or its assets, it would not have permitted the parties to bargain over the
availability of federal jurisdiction.
Landreth, 471 U.S. at 699 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
235. 110 S. Ct. 945, 951 (1990).
236. 471 U.S. at 694.
237. See Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 957 ("Ihe Securities Acts define 'security' to include
*any note.'")
238. The factors include (1) whether the notes are to be used to finance a business or
other substantial investment, (2) the plan of distribution, (3) the public's perceptions and
reasonable expectations about the nature of the interest, and (4) the existence of a regu-
latory scheme which would make application of securities laws unnecessary. Id.
Notwithstanding the emphasis on public expectations reflected in these factors, the
Court seemingly departed from the expectation-based approach. The respondent argued that
the demand notes at issue fell within a statutory exception in the securities laws. This
argument rested on a definition of "maturity" derived from state law. Id. at 953-54. The
court rejected the respondent's attempt to use the state law definition of maturity and held
that federal securities law should be applied to determine the maturity date of a demand
note. Id. at 955.
Investors' expectations regarding the character of a note are arguably shaped by state
law, including the "ancient" law cited by the dissent that deems demand notes immediate-
ly due. Id. at 957-58 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). But even in rejecting application of
state law, the majority's decision was consistent with an emphasis on the parties' expecta-
tions. The expectation on which the court focused was not the specific timing of maturity
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The role of private ordering in the definition of a "security"
also has been stressed in a post-Landreth federal appeals court
decision. In Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, the court applied
Landreth in determining that a fractional undivided interest in min-
erals was a "security. " 9 The court reached this conclusion with-
out regard to the factual context of the transaction because the in-
terest fit within those listed in the statutory defimition.' Al-
though recognizing the argument that sophisticated, active investors
did not need federal securities law protection, the court said that
"even where sophisticated investors are involved, clarity and pre-
dictability of rules are particularly prized in commercial transac-
tions."241 While the court noted that characterization of the inter-
est as a "security" would automatically trigger federal jurisdiction,
it expressed minimal concern about this ramification: "parties are
free to negotiate for arbitration, and private ordering is likely to be
enhanced by a rule sufficiently predictable in its reach to allow the
parties to adjust their affairs."242
In sum, Landreth, Gould and Reves clearly stand for the propo-
sition that "security" should be interpreted in a way that facilitates
private ordering. The Court has not abandoned "economic reality,"
but rather has factored private ordering concerns into this "reali-
ty."' 43 Where, as in Landreth, Reves and Adena, the form of the
transaction triggers strong expectations that the securities laws
apply, the applicable legal rules should enforce those expectations
and thereby facilitate the parties' pricing and structuring of the
deal. The relevant "economic reality" in that situation is the com-
mon understanding within the market place about the state of gov-
for demand notes, but whether or not federal securities laws would apply. The public's
expectations are more likely to be shaped by the type of general market characteristics
stressed by the majority than by the intricacies of state law stressed by the dissent.
239. 860 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1988).
240. Id. at 1249.
241. Id. at 1251.
242. Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of arbitration and its relevance to the opt-
out question see supra text accompanying notes 114-24.
243. The Adena court erroneously reasoned that, while finance theory was generally
important to the application of the securities laws, its application was foreclosed in the
circumstances of the case "by precedent, statutory text, and Congressional intent." Id. at
1253. In fact, as discussed above, neither the text nor Congressional intent compel a
literal reading of the statute. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. It would have been
more accurate for the court to say that under the circumstances of the case, economic
theory justified emphasizing the parties' expectations rather than policies regarding the
appropriate scope of mandatory discsoure.
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erning law. As the court said in Adena, "[o]ne need not be a bota-
nist to know that a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet."
2
"
The rule that has evolved in the sale-of-a-business and note
cases is closely analogous to that urged here for general partner-
ships. Even before Landreth, one commentator argued that the
"sale-of-business" rule emphasizing the substance rather than the
form of a transaction was inconsistent with partnership cases which
emphasize the partners' power under the agreement (form) over
their ability to exercise this power (substance).24 The connection
between the partnership and sale-of-business cases became particu-
larly clear in Rivanna,246 where Justice Powell (who also wrote
Forman, Landreth and Gould), rejected the Williamson approach
directing courts to examine each partner's knowledge and business
expertise.2
7
Indeed, the approach in the sale-of-business cases is not only
analogous to that in the partnership cases, but is also complementa-
ry to the partnership approach. Investors in closely held firms - a
context in which application of the securities laws is at least debat-
able' - can choose coverage of the securities laws by selecting
between the general partnership and close corporation forms.
2. Contrasting Partnership and Non-Partnership Cases
This section focuses on cases decided during the last ten years,
the same period over which the partnership cases evolved from the
Williamson rule. It shows that, where the parties do not adopt the
general partnership or joint venture form, courts continue to apply
the Howey "efforts of others" analysis. Thus, the federal securities
laws have been applied in situations similar, from the standpoint of
mandatory disclosure policy, to partnership investments character-
244. Adena, 860 F.2d at 1253. On the other hand, even where, as in Forman, the par-
ties use "stock," the securities laws do not apply if their application would frustrate the
parties' expectations. In the words of one court: "A lizard with a sign around its neck
reading 'dog' does not change the lizard into a Labrador retriever." Slevin v. Pedersen
Assoc., 540 F. Supp. 437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that calling a joint venture an
"investment contract" does not make it a "security").
245. See Dennis S. Karijala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation
Through the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 428.
246. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir.
1988).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 21315.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
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ized as non-"securities." The difference is best explained by the
private ordering hypothesis. In the cases discussed in this section,
unlike the non-partnership cases, there is no clear adoption of a
non-"security" form, and therefore no basis for holding that the
parties contracted around the securities laws.
A prominent example of the contrast between partnership and
non-partnership investment contract cases is SEC v. Aqua-Sonic
Products Corp.249 In a leading application of Howey decided
shortly after Williamson, the court, in an opinion by Judge Friend-
ly, affirmed an injunction against an unregistered offering of licens-
es to sell a new dental product? ° Each licensee received a terri-
tory in which to promote the product and was offered a sales
agency agreement with the promoter.2s' The court held that the
package was an investment contract even though the sales agency
agreement was optional and even though the agreement offered
important rights to the licensee, including the power to direct con-
trol over pricing and other matters, access to information, and the
right to terminate.252 The court relied on several facts indicating
that the investors would necessarily accept the sales agency and
would not actively exercise their rights under that contract: the
promoter recruited investors unsophisticated in dental supplies;
territories were remote from the residences of the licensees; and for
tax reasons the entire fee for the eight-year agency was payable up
front. .5
3
Significantly, the court explicitly rejected Williamson's stated
emphasis on the investor's right to control rather than actual con-
trol.2" The Williamson rule might have supported characterization
as an investment contract since the facts suggested actual depen-
dence on the promoter. But the licensees' contract rights almost
certainly would have precluded characterization as an investment
contract under the reasoning of Goodwin, Matek and Rivanna if the
promoter had employed the partnership form.
A second important, contrasting case is Hocking v. DuBois, a
recent en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit - the same court
249. 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982).
250. Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 585.
251. Id. at 578.
252. Id. at 582-83.
253. Id. at 583-84.
254. Id. at 584.
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that recently decided Matek.05 The court held in favor of
characterizating as a "security" an investment in a condominium
rental pool run like a hotel.' Although the participants had sig-
nificant powers, including authority to replace the developer, the
court found material fact issues regarding the investors' effective
control, including their level of sophistication, the fact that they
lived far from the condominium, and the difficulty of replacing the
manager.' Significantly, the court relied on Williamison rather
than on Matek, and emphasized the investors' dependence on the
promoter instead of the investors' powers under the agreement." s
This article's analysis supports the conclusion, contrary to that in
Koch, 9 that Hocking's failure to rely on Matek was not a mere
oversight, and that Hocking left Matek undisturbed.
A third category of contrasting cases deals with cattle-feeding
arrangements in which passive investors buy cattle but leave fatten-
ing and slaughter to a feedyard. The courts commonly characterize
these transactions as "securities" because they doubt the investors'
practical ability to exercise their important contractual rights. For
example, in McLish v. Harris Farms, Inc., the court found that a
"security" existed even though the investor had the rights to sell or
move the cattle and to consent to sale by the feedlot.2 The
court noted that the plaintiff had to arrange financing to exercise
these rights. 261 But had the investment been structured as a gen-
eral partnership between the investor and the feedyard, the partner-
ship cases suggest that the court probably would not have held in
favor of a "security" even if the partner had little practical alterna-
tive to abiding by the promoter's decisions.262
The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that all
"investment contract" cases would be non-securities ff the promot-
ers had simply selected the partnership form without substantive
change. For example, participants in cattle feeding investments
255. 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1805 (1990).
256. Id. at 1462.
257. Id. at 1460-61.
258. Id. (noting the court's previous acceptance of Williamson).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07 (discussing Koch).
260. 507 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
261. Id. at 1082.
262. See Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 103 (holding that, as a matter of law, a limited part-
nership interest is not a security); Marek, 860 F.2d at 729-31 (holding that a bona fide
general partnership is not a security); Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 241 (finding that the partners
possession of information and voting rights created a presumption that the general part-
nership was not a security). See also supra text accompanying notes 199-216.
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may, in theory, have power to participate in the management deci-
sions of the feedlot with respect to care and sale of the cattle, but
significantly could not "fire" the manager by moving the cattle to
another feedlot.21 The point is only that the partnership cases are
virtually alone in stressing the investors' formal powers under the
agreement even where the investors may actually be relying on the
promoters' efforts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Strong policy considerations support permitting parties to enter
into agreements that effectively waive application of the securities
laws in some situations. Moreover, such a rule is not inconsistent
with the securities statutes. This is so even if the policies and
factors relating to the scope of mandatory disclosure would justify
application of the securities laws in the absence of a private agree-
ment to the contrary.
This article has shown that, consistent with this proposition,
courts recognize a limited role for private ordering with respect to
application of the securities laws. In particular, this analysis ex-
plains why the courts have moved toward a rule that per se ex-
cludes general partnership interests from the definition of a "securi-
ty."
263. See Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1989); Waterman v. Alta
Verde Indus., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
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